OTHERING & BELONGING
EXPANDING THE CIRCLE OF HUMAN CONCERN

ISSUE 1

The Problem of Othering
John A. Powell & Stephen Menendian

Trump, the Tea Party, the Republicans, and the Other
Lawrence Rosenthal

Racism and the Narrative of Biological Inevitability
Rodolfo Mendoza-Denton & Amanda Danielle Perez

Migration, Austerity, and Crisis at the Periphery of Europe
Ilaria Giglioli

Reflections on Policing
Interview with Community Leaders

Precarious Lives
Daisy Rockwell

Take a Look at Ourselves
Villy Wang with Alex Sorto
ISSUE 1 | SUMMER 2016

OTHERING & BELONGING
EXPANDING THE CIRCLE OF HUMAN CONCERN
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Authors/Contributors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Contributors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Editors’ Introduction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>ARTICLES</td>
<td>The Problem of Othering:</td>
<td>Towards Inclusiveness and Belonging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>John A. Powell</em> and <em>Stephen Menendian</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
<td>Racism and the Narrative of Biological Inevitability</td>
<td><em>Rodolfo Mendoza-Denton</em> and <em>Amanda Danielle Perez</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
<td>Trump, the Tea Party, the Republicans, and the Other</td>
<td><em>Lawrence Rosenthal</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>RESEARCH</td>
<td>Migration, Austerity, and Crisis at the Periphery of Europe</td>
<td><em>Ilaria Giglioli</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>INTERVIEWS</td>
<td>Reflections on Policing:</td>
<td>Organizers in Five Communities Speak Out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Interview with Community Leaders</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113</td>
<td>ARTS</td>
<td>Precarious Lives</td>
<td><em>Daisy Rockwell</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td></td>
<td>Take a Look at Ourselves</td>
<td><em>Villy Wang</em> and <em>Alex Sorto</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONTRIBUTORS

AUTHORS

M. Adams (Reflections on Policing) is a community organizer, movement scientist and co-executive director of Freedom Inc. She is co-author of Forward from Ferguson, a work in progress on Black community control over the police.

Fahd Ahmed (Reflections on Policing) is Executive Director of Desis Rising Up and Moving (DRUM), which organizes working-class and low-income South Asian immigrant workers and youth for worker, racial, educational, and global justice. His work with DRUM is a result of having his own family affected by lack of documentation, deportations, working class status, and police profiling.

Julio Calderon (Reflections on Policing) was born in Honduras and arrived in the United States as an unaccompanied minor in 2005. Julio started his work with Students Working for Equal Rights (SWER) by pushing for the DREAM Act in 2010. He later served as the Education Not Deportation (END) Coordinator for the State of Florida, which helped to build a campaign around DACA. Julio is now the Access to Higher Education Organizer for the Florida Immigrant Coalition.

Ilaria Giglioli (Migration, Austerity, and Crisis at the Periphery of Europe) is a PhD candidate in Geography at the University of California, Berkeley. Her research is focused on cross-Mediterranean migration between Italy and Tunisia, and the making of the Mediterranean border.

Rodolfo Mendoza-Denton (Racism and the Narrative of Biological Inevitability) is an associate professor of psychology at the University of California, Berkeley, and the co-editor of the book, Are We Born Racist?: New Insights from Neuroscience and Positive Psychology. He is a former director of the Greater Good Science Center at UC Berkeley.

Stephen Menendian (The Problem of Othering) is the Assistant Director and the Research Director of the Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society at the University of California, Berkeley.
Simon Moya-Smith (Reflections on Policing) is a citizen of the Oglala Lakota Nation, and the Culture Editor at Indian Country Today, an online Native American newsmagazine. His work appears on CNN, MTV, and USA Today. He has a Master of Arts degree from Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism. Follow him @SimonMoyaSmith.

Amanda Danielle Perez (Racism and the Narrative of Biological Inevitability) is a Ph.D. candidate at UC Berkeley in the Social-Personality department. Her research revolves around implicit biases, prejudice, and the benefits of cross-group friendship. She is a graduate of UC Berkeley.

john a. powell (The Problem of Othering) is an internationally recognized expert in the areas of civil rights and civil liberties and a wide range of issues including race, structural racism, ethnicity, housing, poverty, and democracy. He is the Director of the Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society, Professor of Law and Professor of African American Studies and Ethnic Studies at UC Berkeley, and holds the Robert D. Haas Chancellor’s Chair in Equity and Inclusion.

Andrea Ritchie (Reflections on Policing) is a Black lesbian police misconduct attorney and organizer whose work focuses on policing of women and LGBT people of color. She is a Senior Soros Justice Fellow and co-author of Say Her Name: Resisting Police Brutality Against Black Women. Her new book, Invisible No More: Racial Profiling and Police Violence Against Women of Color, will be published in 2017 by Beacon Press.

Daisy Rockwell (Precarious Lives) paints under the alias, Lapata (pronounced ‘laapataa’), which is Urdu for “missing,” or “absconded,” as in “my luggage is missing,” or “the bandits have absconded.” She has shown her work widely and her essays on literature and art have appeared in Bookslut, Caravan, Outlook Magazine, and The Sunday Guardian.

Lawrence Rosenthal (Trump, the Tea Party, the Republicans, and the Other) is executive director of the Berkeley Center for Right-Wing Studies, a research unit dedicated to the study of right-wing movements in the 20th and 21st centuries. He has taught at Berkeley in the sociology and Italian studies departments and was a Fulbright Professor at the University of Naples in Italy.

Villy Wang (Take a Look at Ourselves) is Founder, President, & CEO of the Bayview-Hunters Point Center for Arts and Technology (BAYCAT). Raised by an immigrant single mother in New York City, Villy’s desire to tell her story forged a passion for using the digital media arts to capture
stories untold and to create social change. Villy received her double B.A. in Engineering and Economics from Brown University, J.D. degree from Northwestern University, and her teaching credential from San Francisco State University.

ARTISTS

**BAYCAT** (*Take a Look at Ourselves*) is a nonprofit social enterprise that provides access, education and employment for low income youth, youth of color and young women.

**Stephen D. Melkisethian** (*Trump, the Tea Party, the Republicans, and the Other*) is a Washington DC native residing in East Bethesda, Maryland. Special interests include documentary style, music and and commercial product photography.

**Stylianos Papardelas** (*Migration, Austerity, and Crisis at the Periphery of Europe*) is from Heraklion, Crete and has worked with numerous non-profit and news organizations as a photographer. (See work at www.stylianospapardelas.com/)

**Cecilia Paredes** (*cover art, and The Problem of Othering*) is a Peruvian contemporary performance and installation artist. The recipient of many international art awards, her solo exhibitions have been held all over the world. Paredes currently lives and works in San Jose, Costa Rica, Lima, Peru, and Philadelphia and is represented by the Arte Sur Gallery. Her work, which is about displaying a theme of relocation and adjustment to one’s surroundings, ultimately aims to illustrate every person’s quest to belong.

**Bayeté Ross Smith** (*Racism and the Narrative of Biological Inevitability*) is a photographer, multi-media artist, filmmaker, and educator living in New York City. He is represented by beta pictoris gallery/Maus Contemporary.

EDITORS

Andrew Grant-Thomas is codirector at EmbraceRace, an online community of parents, teachers, and other caregivers to children. He is also a race and social justice consultant with a wide range of educational, nonprofit, philanthropic, and research institutions. Previously, Andrew has directed work at Proteus Fund, the Civil Rights Project at Harvard University, and the Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race and Ethnicity at Ohio State University, where he was editor-in-chief of its journal, Race/Ethnicity. Andrew earned his BA in Literature from Yale University, his MA in International Relations from the University of Chicago, and his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago.

Rachelle Galloway-Popotas directs the Haas Institute’s communications work in order to bring the work and scholarship of the Institute to the wider world through a variety of media and tools, including publications, events, and online media. Rachelle has worked in the nonprofit communications field for over 15 years, where she has specialized in amplifying mission-driven work through visual and editorial efforts and building a communications infrastructure that will support organizations’ strategic visions.

Stephen Menendian is the assistant director and director of research at the Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society. Stephen leads and oversees many of the Institute’s projects and burgeoning initiatives, including the Inclusiveness Index and opportunity mapping project. Stephen has also developed and authored several amicus briefs on behalf of the Institute, most recently a social science brief filed on behalf of the University of Texas in Fisher v. Texas.

Michael Omi is Associate Professor of Ethnic Studies at UC Berkeley. Omi is the coauthor of Racial Formation in the United States, a groundbreaking work that transformed how we understand the social and historical forces that give race its changing meaning over time and place. The third edition of the book was released in 2015. Omi was the associate director of the Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society since its inception in 2012 and is an affiliated faculty member of Sociology and Gender & Women’s Studies. Michael is a recipient of UC Berkeley’s Distinguished Teaching Award, the campus’s most prestigious honor for teaching and an honor bestowed to fewer than 300 Berkeley faculty members since the award’s inception in 1959.
Welcome to the inaugural issue of *Othering & Belonging: Expanding the Circle of Human Concern*. We are delighted you are here and hope the insights and information you find here will usefully inform your thinking and work.

**THIS NEW PUBLICATION IS** produced by the Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society at the University of California at Berkeley. Our vision is to bring together researchers, community members, policymakers, and communicators to identify and challenge the barriers to a just, inclusive, and sustainable society, and to catalyze transformative change.

This new forum is one expression of our vision. We believe building a world where we recognize and work to meet the needs of all people requires that we promote Belonging and impede Othering. The anchor piece of this first issue, by our Director John A. Powell and Assistant Director Stephen Menendian, examines what we mean when we refer to Othering and Belonging. While Othering processes marginalize people on the basis of perceived group differences, Belonging confers the privileges of membership in a community, including the care and concern of other members. As Powell has previously written, “Belonging means more than just being seen. Belonging entails having a meaningful voice and the opportunity to participate in the design of social and cultural structures. Belonging means having the right to contribute to, and make demands on, society and political institutions.”

We hope this new forum (and its online component at otheringandbelonging.org) will help establish a broad analytic framework that enables us all to better understand and more effectively challenge Othering as it shapes our personal and social realities. We also hope this publication will help break down boundaries between academic research, policy analysis, and engaged practice, and promote more robust collaboration among them.

Our editorial selections in *Othering & Belonging* will be guided by these objectives. Each issue will encompass a wide range of contributions, including theoretical essays, cutting-edge research, critical reflections,
interviews, short documentary films, and artwork. By inviting contributions from people working in the worlds of policy, philanthropy, business, higher education, community activism, and the arts, we hope to transcend barriers and contribute to collective learning. We believe this commitment to inclusiveness grants us the best opportunity to generate new insights into the dynamics of Othering and new possibilities for Belonging.

This inaugural issue presents a mix of conceptual and applied work. We start with “The Problem of Othering,” which authors John A. Powel and Stephen Menendian argue is “the problem of the twenty-first century.” They make the case that an Othering framework illuminates a common set of dynamics that undergird group marginalization and inequality, and also begin to sketch promising pathways toward Belonging.

In “Racism and the Narrative of Biological Inevitability,” Rodolfo Mendoza-Denton and Amanda Danielle Perez examine one subtle but powerful mechanism through which Othering occurs: “implicit social cognition” or “implicit bias.” Implicit bias has drawn a great deal of attention inside and outside the world of racial-justice research and advocacy, along with widespread supposition that implicit racial bias, in particular, might be an unhappy and inevitable part of our evolutionary heritage. Mendoza-Denton and Perez draw on recent breakthroughs in neuroscience to argue that unconscious bias and racism might not be nearly as immutable as many of us fear.

Lawrence Rosenthal and Ilaria Giglioli offer analyses of sociopolitical Othering in the contemporary United States and Europe, respectively. With the 2016 Republican presidential primary season as his point of departure, Rosenthal traces evolving tensions between Tea Party populism and the Republican establishment and its uneasy-at-best resolution in the presidential campaign of Donald Trump (“Trump, the Tea Party, the Republicans, and the Other”).

In “Migration, Austerity, and Crisis at the Periphery of Europe,” Giglioli’s concern is the dramatic increase in poverty, inequality, and xenophobia in Europe in recent years, especially in southern Europe, and their relationship to national and international policies propelled by the politics of austerity. Her work suggests that these policies, responses to the Eurozone and refugee crises, reflect and reinscribe lines of marginalization and exclusion. Taken together, they raise the crucial question: Who “belongs” in Europe?

From reflections on Othering at national and international scales, we move to “Reflections on Policing: Organizers in Five Communities Speak Out,” an interview featuring the voices of leading advocates from the Black Lives Matter, Native Lives Matter, LGBTQ, immigrant, Muslim, Arab, and South Asian communities. These organizers and practitioners speak in heartfelt ways about the stakes involved in their work, the overlaps and
particularities of their communities’ concerns and efforts, and the changes they want to see.

Daisy Rockwell’s “Precarious Lives” offers a different angle on the crisis of policing in communities of color in the United States. Rockwell’s focus is on women of color whose encounters with police officers proved fatal. Her portraits of these women rely not on mugshots, so often the only way the public sees the victims of police violence, but on photos that “showed them the way they wished to be seen.

We close out Issue One with Villy Wang’s “Take a Look at Ourselves,” where we hear directly from young people from low-opportunity neighborhoods in the San Francisco Bay area, their words and perspectives amplified by means of powerful, digitally mediated storytelling. The online version of this piece features a music video produced by a multiracial cast of teens about the media’s role in perpetuating a wide range of harmful stereotypes about Black, Muslim, Latinx, and LGBTQ people.

Our hope is that these contributions, and those to follow in future issues, will cast new light on the roots and dynamics of Othering as it manifests in the lives of individuals and families, neighborhoods and institutions, societies and the world, and that it will help spur a wave of fresh insights into how Othering and Belonging practices play out across different areas of life and a wide variety of human differences with a range of crucial consequences.

Finally, we close with gratitude. Gratitude to all the contributors of this inaugural issue, whose work builds such a strong foundation for this publication. Gratitude to all our funders, whose generous support of our shared goals enables us to advance our mission of doing transformative work. Gratitude to the hundreds of attendees, speakers, and performers who came together for our first Othering & Belonging conference in the spring of 2015, whose momentum from that gathering greatly propelled this framework forward (we hope to see all of you at our next conference in 2017). Gratitude to our many partners and staff, who not only collaborate and work alongside us, but who challenge and inspire us to help bring into being a more just and equitable world. And finally, deepest gratitude to you, our reader, for your interest in this new endeavor. We look forward to engaging with you and working together in building a network of diverse actors rooted in a common framework for realizing a fair and inclusive society.

Yours in Belonging,
Andrew Grant-Thomas, Editor-in-chief
Rachelle Galloway-Popotas, Stephen Menedian, and Michael Omi, Editors
The problem of the twenty-first century is the problem of “othering.” In a world beset by seemingly intractable and overwhelming challenges, virtually every global, national, and regional conflict is wrapped within or organized around one or more dimension of group-based difference. Othering undergirds territorial disputes, sectarian violence, military conflict, the spread of disease, hunger and food insecurity, and even climate change.
In a remarkably candid and wide-ranging recently published interview, US president Barack Obama cited tribalism and atavism as a source of much conflict in the world. In his view, many of the stresses of globalization, the “collision of cultures brought on by the Internet and social media,” and “scarcities,” some of which will be exacerbated by climate change and population growth, lead to a “default position” to organize by “tribe—us/them, a hostility toward the unfamiliar or unknown,” and to “push back against those who are different.”

To see the extent to which group-based differences shape contemporary global conflicts, consider a few less prominent examples from recent headlines:

- Violence erupted between the ethnically Burmese Buddhist majority and the Muslim ethnic minority Rohingyas in Myanmar in 2012. Since then, hundreds of thousands of Rohingyas have been driven from their homes and denied full citizenship rights, despite having lived in Myanmar for centuries. In June 2015, President Obama called upon Myanmar to end discrimination against the Rohingyas.

- In early April 2016, violence erupted in Nagorno-Karabakh, a predominantly ethnically Armenian enclave in southwestern Azerbaijan, where over sixty people were killed and dozens more remain missing. The Armenian population is Christian in the predominantly Muslim country and favors secession and reuniting with bordering Armenia.

- In the fall of 2015, the Turkish government ordered a military attack on separatist Kurds in southern Turkey, and subsequently instituted a curfew in Kurdish-majority towns. Turkey waged military campaigns against Kurds in Syria and northern Iraq, and is afraid that Kurdish rebels are intent on carving out a Kurd nation-state out of the territory of all three states.

Group-based identities are central to each of these conflicts, but in ways that elude simplistic explanations. It is not just religion or ethnicity alone that explains each conflict but often the overlay of multiple identities with specific cultural, geographic, and political histories and grievances that may be rekindled under certain conditions.

In June 2015, a white supremacist walked into a black church in Charleston, South Carolina, during a prayer meeting and shot and killed nine African Americans congregants, including the pastor. The incident prompted deep soul-searching in this former confederate state, which ultimately led to the removal of the historical confederate battle flag from flying atop the state’s capital building upon discovering that the shooter had symbolically wrapped himself in that flag. The incident was a painful reminder of how bitterly contested the history of race and the legacy of Civil War and the failed secessionist cause remains.
Recent terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels also prompted soul-searching among publics in Western Europe, regarding the lack of cultural and geographic integration of ethnic and racial immigrant groups (many of whom hail from former European colonies) and the persistence of discrimination. As one resident of a French banlieue put it, “You do everything for France, to be accepted, but you feel you’re not welcome.” These ethnically identifiable enclaves, a product of urban policy and discrimination as much as housing choice, are a source of alienation and were the site of riots in 2005.

In an interview shortly after the Paris attacks, in which he refused to use the term “Islamophobia,” French prime minister Manuel Valls explained that “[i]t’s difficult to construct a single term that captures the variegated expressions of a broad prejudice.” This article proposes the term “othering” as an answer to Valls’s challenge.

“Othering” is a term that not only encompasses the many expressions of prejudice on the basis of group identities, but we argue that it provides a clarifying frame that reveals a set of common processes and conditions that propagate group-based inequality and marginality. Although particular expressions of othering, such as racism or ethnocentrism, are often well recognized and richly studied, this broader phenomenon is inadequately recognized as such.

We define “othering” as a set of dynamics, processes, and structures that engender marginality and persistent inequality across any of the full range of human differences based on group identities. Dimensions of othering include, but are not limited to, religion, sex, race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status (class), disability, sexual orientation, and skin tone. Although the axes of difference that undergird these expressions of othering vary considerably and are deeply contextual, they contain a similar set of underlying dynamics.

“Othering” is a term that not only encompasses the many expressions of prejudice on the basis of group identities, but we argue that it provides a clarifying frame that reveals a set of common processes and conditions that propagate group-based inequality and marginality.

In this article, we are primarily concerned with group-based othering. Othering and marginality can occur on a group basis or at the individual level. We have all likely experienced the discomfort of being some place or with people where we did not feel that we belong. For many of us, this feeling is transitory and relatively harmless, such as the discomfort of entering into a conversation in which we are not well versed or the embarrassment arising from being dressed inappropriately for a place or occasion. In this article, our
focus is expressions of othering that are more enduring and systematically expressed on the basis of group-based identities or membership.

“Othering” is a broadly inclusive conceptual framework that captures expressions of prejudice and behaviors such as atavism and tribalism, but it is also a term that points toward deeper processes at work, only some of which are captured by those terms. It is not uncommon, for example, to hear commentators refer to Islamaphobia or ethnocentrism as “racism,” although religion and ethnicity are not racial categories. Similarly, antigay and lesbian marriage laws or exclusionary gender norms are expressions of othering, yet those who suffer under them are not defined by ancestry, nationality, religion, or tribe.

The fact that so many leaders and writers fumble when describing these expressions of prejudice while grasping for imprecise analogies underscores the lack of a readily accessible term or frame that reflects the full set of intended meanings. “Othering” is a broadly inclusive term, but sharp enough to point toward a deeper set of dynamics, suggesting something fundamental or essential about the nature of group-based exclusion. Similarly, the term “belonging” connotes something fundamental about how groups are positioned within society, as well as how they are perceived and regarded. It reflects an objective position of power and resources as well as the intersubjective nature of group-based identities.

The language of Othering and Belonging does more than capture and describe processes and forces that undergird group-based marginalization and inequality. Othering and Belonging is a pithy and accessible framework by which we might more productively discuss and develop a range of inclusive responses to group-based marginalization and inequality.

Without purporting to offer comprehensive or exhaustive analysis, this article investigates the forces that contribute to othering and interventions that might mitigate some of the excesses. First, we explore conditions under which processes of othering seem to arise and in which specific group-based identities become socially significant. Second, we begin to illuminate the critical forces that structure othering in the world and by which categorical boundaries and meanings emerge and become institutionally embedded. Finally, we turn toward solutions. We will examine a spectrum of responses to othering and critique many of them as well-intended failures.

We conclude with a call for belonging and inclusion as the only sustainable solution to the problem of othering. As dispiriting as world events may seem, humanity has made tremendous progress toward tolerance, inclusion, and equality. We live in a period of dramatic social change and unprecedented openness in human history. Whether we continue to march toward a more inclusive society while taming our “baser impulses and steadying our fears” depends on us.\textsuperscript{15}
I. Demagoguery and Power

MILLIONS OF AMERICANS WERE shocked and alarmed when presidential hopeful, and leading Republican presidential candidate, Donald Trump, not only announced his intent to build a wall along the United States-Mexican border to keep out “criminals and rapists,” but also demanded a ban on Muslim immigrants, even Syrian refugees, from entering the United States.\(^\text{16}\)

Mitt Romney, the 2012 Republican nominee, condemned Donald Trump for “creat[ing] scapegoats of Muslims and Mexican immigrants,” as well as for “mock[ing] a disabled reporter,” decrying Donald Trump’s remarks as “one outrage after another.”\(^\text{17}\) Speaker of the House of Representatives and putative Republican Party leader, Paul Ryan, denounced Donald Trump’s proposal to ban Muslims from entering the United States as anti-American, noting that freedom of religion and antidiscrimination are fundamental constitutional principles.\(^\text{18}\)

Nonetheless, Trump’s proposal resonated with millions of Americans, anxious of terrorism in the wake of the San Bernardino shootings. Pointing to the prominence of xenophobia in the Trump campaign, some commentators have concluded that Trump is reviving a twenty-first century version of the so-called “Southern Strategy.”\(^\text{19}\) From the late nineteenth century until the Civil Rights Movement, the American South had been a one-party region, dominated by the Democratic Party. Upon signing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Democratic president Lyndon Baines Johnson announced that he had “lost the South for a generation,” anticipating a white backlash.\(^\text{20}\)

Republican political strategists capitalized by quietly appealing to white resentment, even stoking massive resistance to the federal government’s push to end segregation and racial apartheid.\(^\text{21}\) They did so not only by criticizing federal civil-rights legislation and impugning federal desegregation orders, but by railing against busing, government dependency, welfare, or by espousing such seemingly race-neutral ideas as “states’ rights” and “local control” as signals to shield Jim Crow from federal intrusion.\(^\text{22}\)

The “southern strategy” was an overwhelming success. Within a decade, the South had flipped from solidly Democratic to Republican, as Richard Nixon won forty-nine out of fifty states in the 1972 presidential election and carried every southern state by large margins. His opponent, George McGovern, only carried Massachusetts and the District of Columbia, a complete realignment of the national electoral map.

The idea of stoking anxiety, resentment, or fear of the “other” is not a new electoral strategy in American politics. Appeals to nativism, racism, and xenophobia are evident in almost every period of American history.
Cecilia Paredes | Transition
In the mid-nineteenth century, the “know-nothing” movement arose in response to waves of Irish and German immigrants, and enjoyed notable electoral success. Railing against these immigrants not only on the basis of their ethnicity but also their religion, they feared the spread of “papist” designs.

In the early nineteenth century, fears of slave revolts in the South, following the failed uprisings of Nat Turner, Gabriel Prosser, and Denmark Vesey, were skillfully manipulated by local politicians to strengthen and reinforce the ramparts of racial slavery in the South, as well as to reinforce federal proslavery legislation, including the Fugitive Slave laws.

At the turn of the twentieth century, Thomas Watson, one of the leaders of the populist movement and the vice-presidential nominee on the People’s Party ticket in 1896, began to stoke racial resentment in order to revive his political career. As a populist, Watson had waged an inclusive campaign against the robber barons, banks, and railroads, championing the common farmer. Watson abandoned his racially inclusive position by 1904 and 1908, and launched racist and nativist attacks in speeches and in his writings to gin up public support in statewide elections.

Karl Rove, a senior political adviser whom President George W. Bush called the “architect” of his 2004 campaign, credited eleven antigay and lesbian marriage ballot initiatives for helping reelect the president. He and other Republican strategists believed that these ballot initiatives, which all passed with overwhelming support, were instrumental in getting evangelical, rural, and socially conservative voters, a key part of Bush’s electoral base, to the polls in record numbers in key battleground states.

Political strategies informed by “othering” are hardly unique to the United States or even democracies. Aristotle and other ancient Greeks warned of “demagogues”—leaders who used rhetoric to incite fear for political gain. Many autocratic and authoritarian leaders stoke nationalism or resentment or fears of the “other” to prop up or reinforce their own support. Such demagoguery usually involves more than mere appeals to latent fear or prejudice in the population. Demagogues actively inculcate and organize that fear into a political force. Where prejudice was latent, it is being activated; where it is absent, it is being fostered.

Political and economic instability is an objective condition under which demagoguery becomes a more likely political strategy. The end of the Age of Empires during World War I and the end of the Cold War mark two prominent historical junctures in which tribalism, ethnic tensions, and other forms
The idea of stoking anxiety, resentment, or fear of the “other” is not a new electoral strategy in American politics. Appeals to nativism, racism, and xenophobia are evident in almost every period of American history.

of othering became especially salient. As empires fall, solidaristic nationalist identities may give way to latent or subordinate group-based identities.

In a tragic illustration, the Armenian genocide, the first genocide of the twentieth century, was perpetrated as part of an effort to build a more homogenous Turkish state from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. Similarly, the breakup of Yugoslavia at the end of the Cold War precipitated the Srebrenica genocide in Bosnia, the first European genocide in more than half a century. In fact, the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Iron Curtain is linked to six different “frozen conflicts” in the former Soviet Union, including the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh noted at the beginning of this article.

Ultimately, however, demagoguery is not an inevitable feature of political life in periods of geopolitical change or economic turmoil. It is a strategy dependent upon the choices of political actors. Adolf Hitler’s anti-Semitic rhetoric blamed the economic conditions of the Weimar Republic on the nation’s minority Jewish population. Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki played to his majority Shia base by refusing to create an inclusive national government, even as his country became riven with internal ethnic and religious conflict that led to his ouster in 2004.

These concerns partly explain President Obama’s reluctance to use the term “Islamic” terrorism in association with many of the attacks around the world. Although he has been criticized repeatedly by Republican politicians, President Obama objects to the term “Islamic” terrorism, not only on the grounds that it alienates American allies, such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, but the problem he “worry about most is the type that would manifest itself in anti-Muslim xenophobia or in a challenge to American openness and to the constitutional order.” In other words, President Obama is keenly aware of how readily public passions may be inflamed when stoked by strategic othering.

II. The Mechanics of Othering

Throughout history and across the globe, elites and political opportunists have promoted social cleavages and appealed to group-based identities to advance their agendas and accumulate or reinforce political power. But how
do those cleavages emerge in the first place? How are social groupings translated into policies that sediment these social cleavages and exacerbate inter-group inequality? Without purporting to answer these questions definitely, we sketch out some of the processes that explain these dynamics.

**CLASSIFICATION SCHEMES AND CATEGORICAL REASONING**

Scholars have long observed a tendency within human societies to organize and collectively define themselves along dimensions of difference and sameness. Studies since the 1950s demonstrate the tendency of people to identify with whom they are grouped, no matter how arbitrary or even silly the group boundaries may be, and to judge members of their own group as superior. Studies dividing students into completely fabricated groups lead to consistently different perceptions of in-group and out-group members. In the 1954 Robbers Cave study conducted on white middle-class boys at a summer camp, researchers discovered that even the smallest perceived differences may generate intergroup conflict.

Research in the mind sciences in recent decades has begun to reveal processes by which such outcomes may be explained. In particular, research in social psychology and neuroscience illuminates the social construction of group boundaries, the fluidity of these boundaries, the mechanisms by which individuals are sorted into groups, and the emergence of associations and socially significant meanings that map to group differences and extend to individual group members.

To begin with, classification schemes are now understood as necessary to both survival and intelligence, and that human beings may be hardwired to make categorical distinctions. As one scholar explains, “If our species were ‘programmed’ to refrain from drawing inferences or taking action until we had complete, situation-specific data about each person or object we encountered, we would have died out long ago.” To function efficiently, our brains have evolved processes for simplifying the perceptual environment and acting on less-than-perfect information. The mechanism for accomplishing both goals is the use of categories. Associations between color and poisonous berries or appearance and venomous snakes are examples of such categorical reasoning, but they extend to everything in the world, including social life.

Although “human beings are cognitively programmed to form conceptual categories and use them to classify the people they counter,” the content,
definition, and meaning of those categories is not automatic. In other words, although human beings have a natural tendency to make categorical distinctions, the categories themselves and meanings associated with those categories are socially constructed rather than natural.

Our environments and social contexts, which include families, community leaders, and friends, tell us which distinctions matter and which associations, stereotypes, and meanings map to those categories. In that way, our environments prime us to observe particular differences and instruct us on which differences are relevant. These associations are not only descriptive; they impart social meanings that help us navigate our social worlds.

In the 1950s, sociologists developed “group position theory” as a way of explaining race prejudice. According to this theory, group definitions, boundaries, and meanings are the product of complex collective and social processes rather than a result of individual interactions or bias:

Through talk, tales, stories, gossip, anecdotes, pronouncements, news accounts, orations, sermons, preachments, and the like, definitions are presented and feelings expressed...If the interaction becomes increasingly circular and reinforcing, devoid of serious inner opposition, such currents grow, fuse, and become strengthened. It is through such a process that a collective image of a subordinate group is formed, and a sense of group position is set.

This theory suggests how race, or any group-based identity, becomes socially constructed. Rather than arising from an orderly, sequential process, the boundaries of group definition and the constellation of meanings and associations that map to those categories emerge simultaneously.

Once established, group-based identities may seem so fundamental that we ordinarily perceive them as “natural.” As one scholar noted, “Race may be widely dismissed as a biological classification, [but] dark skin is an easily observed and salient trait that has become a marker in American society, one imbued with meanings about crime, disorder, and violence, stigmatizing entire categories of people.” These associations and shared meanings, in turn, affect our perception of those groups.

## UNCONSCIOUS BIAS

Although the discovery of “mirror neurons” suggests that human beings are soft-wired for empathy, the degree of empathy we feel depends on the extent to which we perceive we belong to the same social group. In one study, researchers measured subjects’ experiences of pain across races, but they registered a stronger activation of the brain’s anterior cingulate cortex (the
In other words, although human beings have a natural tendency to make categorical distinctions, the categories themselves and meanings associated with those categories are socially constructed rather than natural.

part of the brain responsible for perceiving the emotions associated with pain) when the subject was of the same race.⁴⁴

In another study, images of persons identified by varying social groupings triggered different responses in the brain when observed under an MRI.⁴⁵ Persons belonging to these especially marginalized outgroups did not even trigger recognition at a neural level as being human, as if they were animals or objects.⁴⁶ Importantly, these studies register results and associations that hold across social groups, even for members of marginalized or stigmatized groups. In the Implicit Association Test, which measures the strength of unconscious group-based associations, 50 percent of African American test-takers registered an unconscious implicit preference for whiteness.⁴⁷

In the last fifteen years, social cognition research has produced similar findings that support elements of group position theory. In particular, scholars have identified two universal dimensions that locate group positions in society: warmth and competence.⁴⁸ According to this model, social groups rating low warmth and low competence are regarded as “despised outgroups,” which include poor blacks and the homeless according to research findings. Social groups that are viewed as low warmth and high competence are an “envied outgroup,” and groups that are viewed as low competence and high warmth are viewed as a “pitted outgroup.” Researchers cite Asian Americans as example of the former, and the elderly as examples of the latter.

OTHERING IN THE WORLD

The categorical boundaries and social meanings inscribed in our minds, consciously and unconsciously, do not remain there but manifest in the world. They affect our behavior and inform our decisions, from whom to marry to whom to hire.⁴⁹ Individual acts of discrimination on the basis of group-based stereotypes harms its victims, but group-based categories and meanings are social and collective. When replicated across society and over time, individual acts of discrimination have a cumulative and magnifying effect that may help explain many group-based inequalities.⁵⁰

As harmful as discrimination, conscious or unconscious, may be on shaping group outcomes, it is the institutionalization and structural features of othering that perhaps most explain group-based inequalities.⁵¹

Today, the most common mechanism for institutionalizing group-based differences is policies or laws that restrict access to communal resources
by out-groups, and thereby hoards those resources for in-groups. Such laws may be explicit, such as racialized immigration and naturalization rules that prevent members of certain groups from becoming citizens, or Jim Crow segregation laws that relegated black Americans to separate and inferior schools, jobs, train cars, restaurants, theatres, public bathrooms, parks, and even water fountains. Such laws may also be designed more surreptitiously to maintain group-based advantages.

**As harmful as discrimination, conscious or unconscious, may be on shaping group outcomes, it is the institutionalization and structural features of othering that perhaps most explain group-based inequalities.**

An example of such an approach is exclusionary land use laws designed to keep out low-income families of color or that restrict whether a social group can move into a neighborhood or a community and allow a dominant social group to control access to community assets and social capital.\(^{52}\)

Although most effective when state mandated, spatial segregation and market dynamics facilitate the hoarding of communal resources even without the hand of the state. For this reason, segregation is often a central feature or revealing marker of societies where othering is occurring. As one scholar explains, “If out-group members are spatially segregated from in-group members, then the latter are put in a good position to use their social power to create institutions and practices that channel resources away from the places where out-group members live, thus facilitating exploitation.”\(^{55}\) Patterns of residential segregation thus facilitate linkages between educational and employment opportunities that protect in-group members’ resources and facilitate the exclusion of outgroups, rendering these patterns durable.\(^{54}\)

When spatial segregation is not possible, group-based stratification is more difficult and costly because “disinvestment in the out-group must occur on a person-by-person, family-by-family basis.”\(^{55}\) It may nonetheless occur on the basis of group-proxies, seemingly “neutral rules” that act as barriers to access, or by prohibiting access to critical institutions, as when women are denied access to prestigious social clubs, such as Augusta National Golf Club, or educational institutions, such as the Virginia Military Institute.\(^{56}\)

In contrast to the assertions of some economists that businesses with a “taste for discrimination” may become uncompetitive, recent research demonstrates the opposite conclusion: discrimination is “persistent and long lasting in market-based economies.”\(^{57}\) At a minimum, there is evidence that markets do not do an effective job of promoting tolerance.\(^{58}\) This
suggests that curbing discrimination is the provenance of policy rather than market forces.\textsuperscript{59}

In summary, human beings appear psychologically programmed to categorize people we encounter at a level below conscious awareness. It is this fact that makes othering ubiquitous, yet the expressions so varied across time and space. Neuroscientists have mapped the networks in the brain that define group boundaries and that internalize meanings and assumptions about different social group into mental shortcuts. These shortcuts are used to evaluate groups, events, and anything encountered in the world, but they also underpin and inform judgments about groups and people that are members of those groups. Perception of individuals as members of a group is then filtered through these shared social meanings. Othering then becomes structured in the world through processes that are institutionalized or culturally embedded at different levels of society, from the neighborhood level to the larger political-legal order.

III. Expanding the Circle of Human Concern

**The Problem of Othering** defies easy answers. There have been many responses to this problem, some of which seemed promising but failed to produce a more inclusive society. Other attempts to resolve the problem of the “other” led to crimes against humanity.

In this part of the article, we briefly survey a range of responses and conclude by suggesting the parameters of a sustainable and effective resolution. The range of failed or disastrous responses greatly exceeds interventions that have successfully resolved intergroup conflict and improved intergroup equality. The search for a single, standardized paradigm or intervention may be futile, but there are principles that must inform any sustainable and effective response.

A sustainable and effective resolution must not only improve intergroup relations but reduce intergroup inequities and group-based marginality. A solution that reduces conflict and fosters stability but fails to reduce group-based marginality is not only unsustainable in the long run, but it does not actually address group-based othering.

**Segregation**

In part II, we noted that segregation plays a critical role in the institutionalization of othering by channeling resource distributions inequitably across social groups.\textsuperscript{60} Paradoxically, segregation generally arises as a policy response
Cecilia Paredes | Paradise Hands
to resolve social tensions and improve outcomes. For example, gender-segregated schools are sometimes demanded, even in the United States, as a way to improve learning outcomes for boys and girls, who, its defenders argue, have difficulty learning in cross-sex environments, which manifest more behavioral problems. Similarly, military officers long advocated for gender-segregated military units for reasons of cohesion and morale, although, more paternalistically, military leaders privately fear negative public reaction to female casualties.

Among progressive educators today, ability-based education segregation is widely supported and broadly practiced to provide personalized instruction and individual support, whether as a result of a physical disability or to tailor programming to ability levels, such as gifted or advanced placement curriculum. There may be reasons to view ability-based grouping as a way to provide additional care or superior curriculum differently than educational segregation on the basis of a racial, religious, or gender identity, but it should be noted that many of the arguments for race- or gender-segregated education in the nineteenth century appear suspiciously similar. This explains a growing movement to integrate students with physical disabilities into regular classrooms—it is an attempt to reduce their marginality by socializing with ability-normed students.

However, good faith paternalism often leads to disastrous outcomes. When sectarian tensions began to escalate in Baghdad during the early years of the American occupation of Iraq, Paul Bremer, the US administrator, segregated the city into sectarian enclaves in the name of peace. As a result, Iraq in 2009 was much more segregated than in 2003, unwittingly replicating a colonial trope. Even when presented as a temporary solution to social conflict, segregation should be viewed skeptically. Segregationists in the American South and apartheid South Africa often defended segregation in terms of social differences between the races, justified in the name of avoiding violence and conflict, and few Americans today would defend the internment of Japanese American citizens during World War II, even though the Supreme Court upheld this broadly supported action in the name of national security.

Some scholars assign partial blame for the Rwandan genocide on colonial leaders who, decades earlier, made sectarian identity more salient than it

At a minimum, there is evidence that markets do not do an effective job of promoting tolerance. This suggests that curbing discrimination is the provenance of policy rather than market forces.
would have been otherwise. Indeed, there is evidence that pan-Iraqi national identity was much stronger before the Bremer regime asked citizens to identify sectarian affiliation. In 2006, then-senator Joe Biden even proposed dividing up Iraq into three different countries—a proposal that many viewed with similar skepticism to the oft-maligned Sykes-Picot Agreement that shaped the national boundaries in the Middle East after World War I and the fall of the Ottoman Empire.

When implemented on the basis of group membership, segregation is not simply physical separation; it is an attempt to deny and prevent association with another group. Denying association with another group is another way of denying that group’s basic humanity. In that sense, segregation is not just spatial projects but ontological.

As James Baldwin wrote, “We are all androgynous, not only because we are all born of a woman impregnated by the seed of a man but because each of us, helplessly and forever, contains the other...we are a part of each other.” The project of segregation fails to acknowledge this deeper reality, and in doing so, exacerbates othering. As one commentator observed in the case of Palestinians and Israelis, segregation has “heightened dehumanization.” Segregation, no matter how well intended, must fail to resolve the problem of the “other.” It is either a denial of the “other’s” full humanity or results in greater intergroup inequality.

SECESSIONISM

Another response to the problem of the “other” is secession. Rather than being forcibly separated or expelled, this occurs when a group seeks to separate from another by choice. From Scotland in the United Kingdom, to the Catalonian region in Spain, to South Sudan, to Belgium, the secessionist impulse is evident across the globe. Following the Brussels terrorist attack, critics of the Belgian (French speaking) federal government’s urban and immigration policy openly speculated whether northern Belgium, ethnically Flemish and Dutch speaking, should secede from the southern, ethnically Walloon, and predominantly French-speaking region.

When a group feels oppressed by another group, secessionism may seem like a reasonable response to resolving intergroup conflict; however, secessionism is actually a close cousin to segregation, if not segregation writ large. Whereas segregation occurs within national boundaries, secession is actually segregation between new boundaries. Although not imposed like most forms of segregation, secessionism suffers from most of segregations flaws. Like segregation, secessionism may reduce intergroup violence, but it does not resolve the problem of the “other.” Secession is a denial of civic bonds and, therefore, seeks to cement group-based differences into nationalistic identities.
More deeply, the trend toward balkanization or breakaway movements cannot resolve the problem of othering for practical reasons. Even where a set of identities correspond to potential geographic boundaries, the overlap is unlikely to be perfect. This leaves some members of the other group in the new territory. For example, the proposal to create a Kurdish state out of parts of Syria, Turkey, and Iraq ignores the fact that this new state will have many other minority groups that may have been majority groups in their former states. In creating an ethnic state for Kurdish minorities, a Kurdistan would have new minorities with similar risks for marginalization and othering.

Similarly, the United States has long supported the so-called “two-state solution” for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a way of resolving all of the tensions that arise from Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory. However, the two-state solution does not answer the question of what may happen to Palestinian citizens of Israel who do not reside in Palestinian territory.

The destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the conclusion of World War I also illustrates the varying ways in which remnant nation-states dealt with the multiethnic populations within their borders. Almost every new state “contained fractions of those minorities that had caused the Hapsburgs such problems.” The threat of othering and intergroup conflict will always remain, no matter how small the remaining geography. In that sense, secessionism is a project of endless balkanization, with no theoretically stable endpoint except the mass forced migration of peoples, with all of the attendant harms that would entail.

Moreover, group-based identities are multifaceted and complex. No matter how homogenous a society may appear along one dimension of difference, it will always contain a multitude of possible diversities along other dimensions of human difference. There will always be human difference in any society, and a minority or marginalized group in any geography can never be fully extirpated without violence.

The failure of secessionism is already evident in the world’s newest nation, South Sudan, whose existence was intended to resolve racial and ethnic marginality by breaking away from Sudan, yet simply reversed them, creating a new majority. Shortly after coming into existence, South Sudan was riven by civil war. And although a fragile peace was negotiated in 2015, the conflict is spilling over the new nation’s border.

**ASSIMILATION**

Another, perhaps more benevolent response to the problem of the “other” is assimilation. Assimilation is an attempt to erase the differences that define group boundaries, such as by teaching the dominant language to a subordinate group or converting the out-group into the dominant religion. Assimilation was a mode of resolving ethnic differences in American society when
immigrant groups arrived into the “melting pot.” This is how Germans, Irish, Polish, and many other European ethnic groups became “white.” However, it is also what happened when many governments, including the American, Australian, and Canadian, attempted to “civilize” native and aboriginal populations. The result was a devastating loss of cultural knowledge and identity.

Assimilation is also a false solution to the problem of othering, as we have defined it, in terms of reducing group-based marginality and inequality. Rather than reduce intergroup inequality or marginality, assimilation seeks to erase the differences upon which othering is structured. If those differences or identities become socially relevant or personally significant, assimilation, as a project, is a nonstarter.

Moreover, group-based identities and differences cannot be entirely erased. In an assimilationist paradigm, they are submerged or repressed. In this way, assimilation is inherently hierarchical. It demands that the marginalized group adopt the identity of the dominant group, leaving the latter’s identity intact. When doing so on the basis of, say, religion, this is not only oppressive but antithetical to American values.

**BELONGINGNESS**

We believe that the only viable solution to the problem of othering is one involving inclusion and belongingness. The most important good we distribute to each other in society is membership. The right to belong is prior to all other distributive decisions since it is members who make those decisions. Belongingness entails an unwavering commitment to not simply tolerating and respecting difference but to ensuring that all people are welcome and feel that they belong in the society. We call this idea the “circle of human concern.”

Widening the circle of human concern involves “humanizing the other,” where negative representations and stereotypes are challenged and rejected. It is a process by which the most marginalized outgroups are brought into the center of our concern through higher order love—the Beloved Community that Dr. King envisioned.

A prime example of how we might do this is by sending messages to outgroups that they belong and are welcome in our community and society. In an effort to improve academic performance and graduation rates among marginalized student populations at the University of Texas, the university began reaching out to at-risk students with welcoming messages. This was a product of research that demonstrated that student performance was impacted by self-doubts of one’s academic potential. The simple message of belonging not only improved academic performance but also improved student health, with those who had received the message having significantly fewer doctor’s visits in the study period.
Belongingness must be more than expressive; it must be institutionalized as well. To counteract othering, we must focus on providing access to resources and critical institutions to disadvantaged groups. At the same time, integration is necessary but not always sufficient. Many groups require more than access; they require special accommodations.

The Americans with Disabilities Act, one of the most successful, landmark civil-rights laws in American history, did more than prohibit discrimination; it required proactive accommodations to ensure that merely “equal” treatment did not produce or reinforce inequality. Formal guarantees of equal protection or equal rights are often insufficient to create inclusive structures.

Design of societal-level arrangements must be inclusive to all but especially sensitive to the most marginalized and most multiply disadvantaged. Individuals and groups that are “othered” in multiple ways—known as “intersectionality”—may experience multiple binds of oppression. When individuals or groups experience multiple forms of disadvantage simultaneously, interventions that merely address or target one form of disadvantage will fail to free those individuals from disabling barriers.

Democratic societies may tend to advantage electoral majorities over the interests of minorities, which merely underscores the need for structural safeguards for fairness and inclusivity. There must be representational forms that give voice to minority needs and to ensure that the structures and political processes do not burden minority groups. With a rights-based approach, there are successful examples of overcoming polarization, such as the new consensus on same-sex marriage.

Beyond structural safeguards, we need a vision of society that is inclusive with new identities and narratives that inoculate societies from demagoguery and demonization of the “other” while improving the well-being of everyone. One possible alternative to the “acculturative” strategies of assimilation, integration, separation, or marginalization is “voice” and “dialogue.” Voice can give expression to group-based needs and issues without resorting to segregation or secession. This approach is consistent with pluralism and multiculturalism in a democracy.

Pluralism and multiculturalism are solutions to the problem of othering that provide space for not only tolerance or accommodation of difference but that ultimately support the creation of new inclusive narratives, identities, identities,
and structures. If the idea of creating new identities seems radical, consider how recent American national identity is in a historical context, let alone the myriad forms of gender and sex-based identities have emerged only in recent years.\textsuperscript{85}

In the United States, “Irish” was once a racialized category but is now encompassed within “white.”\textsuperscript{86} Socially constructed group-based identities are subject to revision and redefinition, and may become more or less salient depending on social conditions. Even individuals may be sorted differently depending on social cues that may map to categorical meanings. In one study, a researcher found that funeral directors were more likely to list a deceased person as “black” if they died as a result of homicide (even when family members listed the person as being of another race).\textsuperscript{87} Categorical boundaries are surprisingly fluid, not only at the individual level but at the group level as well.

We must not only create inclusive structures, but we must foster new identities and inclusive narratives that can support us all. This means generating stories of inclusion that reframe our individual and group identities while rejecting narratives that pit us against others. This is partly why President Obama rejects the cultural and ethnic arguments visible in the work of scholars like Samuel Huntington, who counsel in favor of curtailing Latin American immigration and pit Islam as antithetical to the liberal order.\textsuperscript{88}

As we transition through political and economic realignments, we also go through a remaking of ourselves. The end of empires and the Cold War were large-scale structural changes that dissolved one set of identities without replacing them with viable, solidaristic alternatives. It is little wonder that latent ethnic and religious identities become most salient. We must offer inclusive alternatives.

\section*{Conclusion}

\textbf{THIS ARTICLE EXPLORED THE} widespread problem of othering in the United States and the world. Virtually every global and regional conflict, as well as persistent form of marginality or inequality, is undergirded by the set of processes that deny full inclusion and membership in society. This article argued that othering is not only a more descriptively inclusive term that captures the many expressions of broad prejudice across any of the dimensions of group-based difference, but it serves as a conceptual framework featuring a generalizable set of processes that engender group-based marginality.

Othering and Belonging is a framework that allows us to observe and identify a common set of structural processes and dynamics while remaining
sensitive to the particulars of each case. Group-based othering may occur along any salient social dimension, such as race, gender, religion, LGBTQ status, ability, or any socially significant marker or characteristic. This article presented mechanisms by which social differences become institutionalized and structured in the world, and conditions under which identities may shift and demagoguery may seem most appealing.

Finally, we examined how promoting belonging must begin by expanding the circle of human concern. Belonging is the most important good we distribute in society, as it is prior to and informs all other distributive decisions. We must support the creation of structures of inclusion that recognize and accommodate difference, rather than seek to erase it. We need practices that create voice without denying our deep interrelationship.

We cannot deny existential anxieties in the human condition. These anxieties can be moved into directions of fear and anger or toward empathy and collective solidarity. In periods of turbulent upheaval and instability, the siren call of the demagogue has greater power, but whether a society falls victim to it depends upon the choices of political leaders and the stories they tell.

The authors would like to thank Connie Cagampang Heller, Michael Omi, and Elsadig Elsheikh for their feedback and comments, and Darren Arquero for his research assistance.
The difference between Nixon and George Wallace’s more explicit racist campaign was that Nixon appealed to white resentment without explicitly racist language.

A central tenet of the know-nothing movement was the belief that Catholicism was inconsistent with democratic principles and that Catholic voters would be compelled to vote on the basis of their religion. As a historical parallel, it is worth noting that similar reasoning has been advanced in defense of the proposals to prohibit Muslim immigrants and refugees, accompanied by critiques of sharia law as inconsistent with democratic principles and individual liberty. It should be noted that this was a critique of JFK as well, the nation’s first Catholic president.


27 It should be noted that, although the empirical evidence does not necessarily support Rove’s contention, what matters most is that he believed it did. See Daniel A. Smith, Matt DeSantis, and Jason Kassel, “Was Rove Right? Evangelicals and the Impact of Gay Marriage in the 2004 Election,” in 58th Annual State Politics and Policy Conference (East Lansing, 2004), http://polisci.msu.edu/sppc2004/papers/FIPPM/Smith%20DeSantis%20Kassel%20Was%20Rove%20Right.pdf


29 Most recently, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been accused of increasingly illiberal policies, including media censorship and crackdowns on political opponents. In June 2015, Erdogan’s party, the AKP, which had governed Turkey since 2002, lost its parliamentary majority, winning just 40.9 percent of the vote. In August, following a hung parliament, Erdogan called for snap elections that November, shortly before launching the war against Kurdish separatists in Turkey. Playing to the nation’s fears and political chaos, Erdogan’s party managed to gain 49.5 percent of the vote, securing a majority of seats in the parliament once again. Many observers viewed Erdogan’s military tactics as an electoral strategy, which, by polarizing the Turkish electorate, helped reinforce his support. See Dion Nissenbaum and Emre Peker, “Turkey’s Ruling AKP Regains Parliamentary Majority in Election,” The Wall Street Journal (Dow Jones & Company), November 2, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/erdogan-seeks-to-consolidate-rule-in-turkish-election-1446636600


31 Judy Monholen, “The Effect of Nazi Propaganda on Ordinary Germans,” Saber and Scroll 1, no. 1 (March 2012).

ibid.


See Charles Tilly, Durable Inequality (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). Charles Tilly identifies exploitation and opportunity hoarding as two of the critical mechanisms for institutionalizing group-based difference. The most extreme mechanism of othering is outright exploitation of marginalized groups. Exploitation allows one social group to expropriate resources produced or held by another social group, as was the case during antebellum slavery or European colonialism. See also Ali Jarbawi, “Israel’s Colonialism Must End,” New York Times, August 4, 2014, accessed February 16, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/05/opinion/al-ibarawi-israels-colonialism-must-end.html. Centuries of European colonialism have provided the world with certain basic lessons about subjugating colonized peoples: the longer any colonial occupation endures, the greater the settlers’ racism and extremism tend to grow. This is especially true if the occupiers encounter resistance; at that point, the occupied population becomes an obstacle that must either be forced to submit or removed through expulsion or murder. In the eyes of an occupying power, the humanity of those under its thumb depends on the degree of their submission to, or collaboration with, the occupation. If the occupied population chooses to stand in the way of the occupier’s goals, then they are demonized, which allows the occupier the supposed moral excuse of confronting them with all possible means, no matter how harsh.


Massey, Categorically Unequal, 19.

Tilly, Durable Inequality, 38.


Again, employment discrimination against gay and lesbian persons is legal in more than thirty states despite many leading companies’ different policies, such as Apple.

See Carl Husemoller H. Nightingale, Segregation: A Global History of Divided Cities (United States: University of Chicago Press, 2012). Segregation traces back more than seventy centuries, as early as the Babylonian Ziggurat and ancient walled cities, marking separate residential territories for “classes, clans, castes, crafts, nations, religions, civilizations, and even sexes” (19). Segregationist practices arose in every part of the globe and in almost every human civilization since the first cities were erected, although the high-water mark for segregation was the twentieth century, as colonial capitals across the globe were deliberately segregated.


The social construction of group boundaries is also the social construction of the self. See Aydan Gülerce, “Selfing As, With, and Without Othering: Dialogical (im)Possibilities with Dialogical Self Theory,” Culture & Psychology 20, no. 2 (2014): 244–55. Gülerce defines othering as “an un/conscious and primarily projective disidentification with an attempt to organize all of the disowned, or non-self-experience,
and history under an equally illusory unified or cohesive category” (245). Gülerce essentially argues that “othering” and “selfing” are flip sides of the same coin in Western thought and psychology.


73 ibid.


75 Some scholars refer to this as one of several “acculturation strategies,” including integration. See Gülerce, “Selfing As, With, and Without Othering.”


81 ibid.


84 Gülerce, “Selfing As, With, and Without Othering.” 250.


88 Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004). See also Michiko Kakutani, “Review: Michel Houellebecq’s ‘Submission’ Imagines France as a Muslim State,” Books (New York Times), November 3, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/04/books/review-michel-houellebecqs-submission-imagines-france-as-a-muslim-state.html. The most recent prominent cultural product to play on such fears is French author Michel Houellebecq’s wildly successful and controversial novel Submission, set in 2022, in which an Islamic party sweeps into power in France. The novel entered a cultural matrix in which debates over immigration, integration, and fear of terrorism are central elements. Although a satire, the novel preys upon fears within Western Europe of growing Muslim populations, just as refugee numbers crest toward numbers not seen since WW II.

Racism and the Narrative of Biological Inevitability

Rodolfo Mendoza-Denton & Amanda Danielle Perez

Artwork by Bayeté Ross Smith
As we approach the conclusion of the Obama presidency, it is ironic to think that it is bookended by two very different narratives around race. On the 2008 end, there were pronouncements of a “post-racial” America where the election of a black man to the presidency signaled that we had turned a corner towards egalitarianism and improved race relations.

Almost Eight Years Later, the prevailing narrative is much different, poignantly summarized in one succinct phrase: Black Lives Matter. It is a reminder that legal—indeed human—rights continue to be differentially accorded to people based on their race, which perpetuates a culture of othering. In between those bookends, we have seen continuous reminders that law enforcement is one of the principal arenas where race-based injustice plays out—from the arrest of Henry Louis Gates, Jr., to the killing of Trayvon Martin and debates about the reach of stand-your-ground laws, to the alarmingly consistent string of deaths of black women, youth, and men—Sandra Bland, Mike Brown, Eric Garner, Freddie Gray, India Kager, Tamir Rice—at the hands of police.

The seemingly irreconcilable nature of these realities, where we can have such injustices perpetrated against African Americans in a country that elected an African American man to its highest office, reflects a modern paradox that centers on the question of whether racism is a biological inevitability that will forever resurface, in spite of our nation’s best efforts. In the years since the 2010 publication of Are We Born Racist? New Insights from Neuroscience and Positive Psychology, co-edited by Mendoza-Denton, the notion of implicit bias—the automatic yet measurable associations that people have about others, and the behaviors that these associations unconsciously influence—has slowly gained traction to inform our understanding of modern racism. The fact that implicit bias occurs outside of our awareness but affects explicit behaviors, from pulling the trigger of a weapon to judging a resume to disciplining young children, can be highly threatening to people’s self-concept. This is particularly true among people who consider
themselves egalitarian. It triggers very personal questions about who one really is: “Does my having implicit bias invalidate my egalitarianism?” “Will other people think of me as racist?” “Am I, at a deep and unconscious level, immutably racist?”

New findings in neuroscience suggest that the answer might well be no.

Lay theories of racism

WHEN WE THINK OF “racists,” our minds do not conjure up subtleties. Rather, our imaginations jump to easy prototypes of overtly racist cops, like the one in the movie Crash, perhaps, or individuals like the character played by Edward Norton in American History X. Psychologists have labeled the type of racism depicted by these characters old-fashioned racism, in which a person’s prejudiced behavior mirrors their core beliefs and attitudes. This type of racism was characteristic of majority group members’ attitudes in the 1950’s. What current discussions about implicit bias recognize, however, is that people who hold a negative attitude or stereotype that is publicly frowned upon may feel social pressure not to admit or act on that stereotype and get “caught.” This is a situation in which people’s outward behavior may no longer correspond to their underlying beliefs. Social psychologists have labeled this duality as an external motivation to respond without prejudice, but the term “politically correct” comes readily to mind. It implies that egalitarian behavior is not real or truly felt, but instead put on for the sake of appearances to hide the monster underneath. This idea helps us explain the contradiction between outward behavior and inner attitude in a way easily understood by analogy to a costume. Through this lens, behavioral manifestations of racism demonstrate what a person is really like underneath the veneer of egalitarianism. In this conceptualization, evidence of racism invalidates all efforts towards egalitarianism as mere cover-up, not only in others but in ourselves as well.

A more problematic kind of prejudice to make sense of is aversive racism, in which a person sincerely values egalitarianism yet engages in some kind of behavior that betrays bias—reflexively clutching one’s handbag as a black man walks by, a microaggression, even a weapon discharge.
A more problematic kind of prejudice to make sense of is aversive racism, in which a person sincerely values egalitarianism yet engages in some kind of behavior that betrays bias—reflexively clutching one’s handbag as a black man walks by, a microaggression, even a weapon discharge. The research literature on implicit bias is helpful in understanding this paradox, since it explains biased behavior in terms of automatic processes that occur largely outside of consciousness. By situating the study of bias within the narrative of unconscious vs. conscious processes, however, we also situate the study of bias within a long tradition of dual process models of behavior, which may unwittingly give the impression that bias and racism is more immutable and biologically determined than it may actually be.

The intractable unconscious—
the influence of Sigmund Freud

**THE LEGACY OF SIGMUND** Freud has penetrated so deeply into our popular culture in part because it provided a way to explain the tensions and paradoxes that characterize human behavior. In fact, much of the popular fascination with Freud is due to the fact that he attempted to explain seemingly inexplicable behavior on the basis of unconscious motivations buried deep inside our psyches. Many people now are familiar with the Id, the Ego, and the Superego, which Freud proposed as a kind of multi-stage model of behavioral regulation.

The Id represented that part of us that is primitive, crude, and caveman-like, with base desires and wants in need of regulation by the Ego and Superego for proper functioning in civilized society. In our popular culture, the Id is understood to house our deepest, most animal desires— for food, for sex, for aggression— and the other systems work hard to cover, displace, or translate those base desires into more acceptable forms. Woven into this narrative is the idea that the Id represents an evolutionarily earlier time of human history— the caveman within us— and the superego a more evolved, sophisticated form. Paradoxical behavior is explained as the observable collateral damage from the battles between the Id and the Superego. It is a rich and vivid model to explain the handbag clutch, the microaggression, and the weapon discharge in people who disavow racism.

In the same way that we might see a Freudian slip as a peek into one’s true feelings or a dream interpretation as the truest road into our most deep-seated fantasies, so are unconscious biases often seen as yielding an x-ray into our souls, a barometer of how racist a person really and truly is. We tend
to see unconscious bias as constituting our truest, deepest motivations—who we really are underneath the dress-up of the controlled public response. As such, what really “counts” towards whether one is racist or not is not the egalitarian motivation or behavior, but rather the bias beneath.

And so the notion of doing or saying something that might reveal one’s true racist tendencies leads people to avoid situations in which they might be somehow caught off guard, saying or doing things that might be considered racist. This process is extremely aversive, placing people under the threat that they might themselves confirm a stereotype of being racist. The behavioral consequences include avoidance of situations where one might say something racist, as well as spending undue time in interracial interactions monitoring one’s behavior to the detriment of the interaction itself. People end up being, and appearing, deeply uncomfortable in interracial interactions, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Neuroscience adds to the dualist narrative

IN RECENT DECADES, A literature in neuroscience has conformed to an astonishingly similar dualist narrative, in which a primitive part of our brains -- the limbic system-- is literally covered and regulated by a more recently evolved neocortex that makes us uniquely human. Indeed, we now often hear descriptions of the limbic system as our “primate brain” that responds to environmental cues with the same level of sophistication as an ape might muster. Lightning quick and outside of our control, the limbic system has been called the seat of our fight-or-flight responses, which presumably kept our furry hides alive in the prehistoric dawn of time. A central player in this primate narrative is the amygdala, a pair of almond like structures that forms part of the limbic system. Early findings that the amygdala responds strongly to fear conditioning led to an understanding of the amygdala as the “first stop” of environmental danger cues in the brain, the structure that sets in motion the fight or flight response.

A significant chapter in our understanding of implicit bias was written with findings showing differential amygdala activation for faces of different
races, as well as findings showing a relationship between levels of implicit bias and amygdala activity. These findings have fueled a conception of implicit bias as not only unconscious and automatic, but additionally as part of our prehistoric heritage—biologically determined and woven tightly within our DNA, with our only hope being to contain it but never to realistically “fix” it. Primitive/modern; Early/late; automatic/controlled; emotion/cognition; id/superego—our explanations of racism have to date fallen neatly into well-worn dualist narratives of how our minds work.

Challenging the dualist narrative

DESPITE THE PULL OF the dualist narrative, recent research is beginning to challenge the core assumptions of this narrative, and in so doing is allowing us to understand racism not as biological destiny, but as social construction that can be changed.

Once again, the amygdala plays a central role. Researchers are beginning to show that the amygdala, rather than responding exclusively to negative or fear-inducing stimuli to trigger a fight-or-flight response, instead seems to be exquisitely sensitive to affectively important information in the environment. This is a subtle but important difference, and suggests that the amygdala’s response may depend on the task or the situation at hand. In one study, for example, when researchers had participants rate the negativity of a set of faces, the amygdala tracked the negativity judgments nicely, which is consistent with prior findings. However, when the task was to judge the positivity
of the same faces, the amygdala also tracked those responses. In yet a third condition, when respondents were asked to use a scale that was anchored by both positive and negative endpoints, the amygdala ended up tracking the overall intensity of the responses.

In another study, researchers had participants sort a set of identical faces. In one condition the participants had to sort the faces according to race; in the other the participants had to sort the faces according to an arbitrarily assigned team membership. Again, across both conditions, the amygdala tracked the relevant group membership that had been flagged for the particular task in front of them, not just the race information. This finding suggests that race is not necessarily privileged by the amygdala as a fear-inducing or evolutionarily significant feature of humans per se, but instead a socially significant basis for group categorization. Importantly, group categorizations are socially constructed, and these findings begin to shape a new narrative around racism, its origins, and its antidotes.

These findings are interesting in two ways. First, of course, they challenge the notion that the amygdala only tracks fear-related stimuli. Second, and perhaps even more importantly, they begin to disrupt the very notion of a dualistic brain system, where one part (the limbic system) responds to basic,
low-level stimuli, and the more recently evolved one (the neocortex) is in charge of higher level processes, such as responding to different rating scales or differentiating between members of socially fabricated teams.

According to the dualistic model, we used to consider the processing of environmental features associated with the limbic system, such as basic emotions, part of our shared human heritage honed over millions of years. The evidence suggested that race was part of that heritage too, but scientists are now coming to a different conclusion. Rather than processing stimuli in the world serially, it seems that the brain processes information about the world in parallel, with top-level features (e.g., team membership) influencing the processing of low-level features (e.g., face information). This is a monumental shift in the way that we think about information processing and the brain more generally. An increasingly accepted view is no longer that certain brain regions are associated with specific tasks, and that some features are more automatic than others. Rather, science is now beginning to recognize that the brain is interconnected, processing information in parallel. Whole-brain processing, you might call it.

Racism: from biological inevitability to malleable social construction

WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS of this new way of thinking and conceptualizing brain function for our understanding of prejudice and how we can address it? At its most basic level, a new understanding of the brain not as an onion-like organ that reveals the layers of our evolution helps us recognize the possibility that the brain is interconnected. As such, the structure of the brain may not mirror the traditional distinction between low-level, automatic processes, and those processes that are more top-down, controlled, or “evolved.” To the degree that we conceptualize processing of race as an automatic process, we may be mistakenly thinking of it as innate, or something we are born with-- something that can, at best, only be covered up.

Findings showing that even the most automatic of processes are modulated by top-level processes are profound because they reaffirm that when we see evidence that race is processed automatically, it doesn’t mean that it is a biological inevitability. Rather, it reaffirms that the brain adjusts to quickly process information that is deemed socially relevant, and as such it is within our power to redefine what is socially relevant. It changes our view of having to effortfully overcome our base racial biases, to a more hopeful possibility:
that one day we may redefine our social environment so that it doesn’t put social significance around race.

We see evidence of this around us, albeit in social environments that are temporary. When we are cheering for the home team, for example, our social environment is engineered so that this category membership (home team) is what becomes salient, and our brain activity is marshaled to act on that information. When we travel to another country and meet someone from our same town, that shared social identity is tracked by our brains. Psychologists have known for a long time that our social categorizations are fluid, such that the same person can be considered an in-group member (e.g. countryman, fellow human) or an out-group member (different team, different race). These categorizations have been found to affect how we treat other people, how much we share with them, and our attitudes towards them. Brain science is now catching up to this work to lend credence to the idea that we are not replacing automatic impulses with mental tricks. Rather, the mental “tricks” are themselves part of our evolutionary heritage, and may be part of the adaptations that have made us so successful as a species.

**To effectively improve race relations between police departments and communities, we must go after institutional reform, rather than focus on attempts to get rid of the few “bad apples.” We must look at the apple barrel itself.**

This does not mean that automatic or implicit biases do not exist. Rather, it changes our way of approaching them, so that instead of asking the question of whether a person is or is not racist, we can now think of the ways in which we might engineer our social environment to address racism, without thinking that it’s a blanket fix for what is ultimately biologically unavoidable.

**Systems-level Transformation**

**Law Enforcement Agencies in** the United States are an obvious arena where engineering our environment is necessary. In 2015, 1,140 people were killed by police officers in the United States. Racially, African Americans are overrepresented among those killed by police officers, and this finding is more pronounced when looking at the numbers of unarmed people killed.
In order to effectively address the issue of racially biased policing, it is necessary to make two clarifications. First, implicit bias is not limited to ill-intentioned racist police officers. Rather, implicit bias is an issue that seeps into the human condition, and even well-intentioned police officers are susceptible to it just like anybody else. Second, to effectively improve race relations between police departments and communities, we must go after institutional reform, rather than focus on attempts to get rid of the few “bad apples.” We must look at the apple barrel itself.

Creating policies that address the impact of implicit biases on policing is one path to institutional reform. The Oakland Police Department, for example, has enacted a policy change for foot patrols to combat the problem of unchecked implicit biases influencing officer reactions. This policy requires officers to wait for backup when following a suspect into a backyard, to avoid a confrontation with heightened emotionality.

In addition to policies, it is important to focus on police department training that would help officers learn to recognize and accept their own implicit biases. One current re-training program, Fair and Impartial Policing (FIP), focuses on breaking the initial defensive and hostile reactions surrounding this topic, and working to have officers identify the roots of their bias. A main goal of FIP is to have officers acknowledge and weaken their implicit associations between African Americans and crime. To date, 250 agencies have employed FIP training. The Richmond, CA Police Department, which has undergone FIP training, has been nationally praised recently for its effective community policing. The Richmond Police Department has increased the diversity of its new police hires; officer involvement in fatal shootings is rare; and overall crime rates have dropped.

This type of training has been shown to be most effective when community members and police officers work hand-in-hand to learn about reducing and managing their biases. Importantly, it shows that changes in biased behavior is possible through structural change. Going back to our bad-apples-versus-bad-barrel metaphor, it is necessary to discuss when and where these changes should be implemented. If trainings and policies are only instituted in areas with instances of racialized police brutality, then once again only the bad apples are being treated. Rather, to treat the barrel as a whole, reforms need to be implemented system-wide. Such reforms also send a clear message that the institution of law enforcement is committed to working towards equitable policing.

It is important to note that this reasoning does not excuse the behaviors of police officers involved in unjust police brutality, which in turn has led to an ongoing climate of rising hostility between police officers and the communities they serve. Hostile police officer-community relations lead to feelings of othering and perpetuates an “us versus them” mentality. These hostile
relations, borne out of the consequences of implicit biases, are important to focus on due to the high cost of human lives at stake.

We cannot afford to deny or excuse implicit bias on the basis of its biological inevitability.

Learn about your own potential biases: https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/takeatest.html

FIP: http://www.fairimpartialpolicing.com/

REFERENCES

In the spring of 2015 it looked as if the 2016 Republican primary season was going to be a near replay of 2012. In 2012 the campaign drama emanated from the Republican civil war: the party’s “establishment” versus its insurgent Tea Party wing. Tea Party blogs were in agony: an Obama reelection was nothing short of a horror and the ratification of what Tea Partiers often called tyranny, now Marxist, now Muslim.
people the y!

TAKE BACK YOUR REPUBLIC

TIME'S UP
IT WAS A GUT feeling, a taken-for-granted tenet of everyday dialogue in the movement. Running a “real conservative,” the faithful believed, was the Republican Party’s sure path to the White House. Yet—and this created abiding resentment—the Republican National Committee, acting “like the Central Committee of the Communist Party,” worked to impose Mitt Romney’s, the establishment’s, candidacy. On the primary campaign trail, the result was the rise and fall in the polls of a series of anybody-but-Romney candidacies, among whom were Michele Bachmann, Herman Cain, Rick Perry, Newt Gingrich and, finally, Rick Santorum.

This year the script was readied with Jeb Bush, the establishment’s choice; and Tea Party stalwarts Ted Cruz, Mike Huckabee, Rand Paul, the Ricks Perry and Santorum, and Bobby Jindal arrayed to take him down. After all, “priming”—running a hard right Tea Partier to topple a RINO (“Republican in name only”) incumbent seen as inadequately conservative—had established itself as a Tea Party strength; along with legislative obstructionism, it was one of its two prize political tactics.

The movement was coming off one of its most historic primary triumphs in the 2014 elections, having brought down the number two Republican power in the House of Representatives, Eric Cantor of Virginia. By late September, Tea Party obstructionism would succeed in forcing the House’s number one Republican, Speaker John Boehner, to zip-a-dee-doo-dah his way into retirement.

But on June 16, 2015, things in the 2016 campaign changed. The 2012 script went haywire. Donald Trump, the New York real-estate mogul with a passion for the look and sound of his own name, announced his candidacy for the Republican nomination. In his eponymous midtown tower, he was introduced by his daughter and surrounded by aspiring actors, who had answered a casting call and were paid fifty dollars a head to express joy at the news.

Odd as these trappings were, they paled next to the bizarre nature of Trump’s political style. Trump’s speeches are vulgar stream-of-consciousness rambles reminiscent of barroom braggadocio, at once putting down the opposition as stupid morons, and then lionizing his own wealth, belovedness, and deal-making smarts. He invites his listeners to join in on his omnipotent fantasy solutions, be they building a Mexican-financed wall to keep out Mexicans or extinguishing the chaos in the Middle East through building a terrifying military. With a startling touch of consistency, the man who rails “the big problem in this country is political correctness” raised political incorrectness into a winning political formula.
The Tea Party Meets Trump

DESPITE WIDESPREAD DISMISSIVE RESPONSES to his announcement—“Clown Runs for President,”” shouted the New York Daily News—Trump, amazingly, shot to the top of the polls. What was missed in the analysis of the day was how thoroughly Trump, who had prepared himself for his presidential run by listening to right-wing talk radio, had grasped the sweet spot of the Tea Party, the Republicans’ deepest well of primary voters. With unprecedented directness, he had addressed himself to the movement’s fiercest 2016 passion—the immigration question. Here’s how Judson Phillips,7 leader of the Tea Party Nation, had put it in April of 2015, where by “Amnesty” he refers to any form of immigration reform:

For conservatives in 2016, amnesty is the defining issue. There is no middle ground. There cannot be any form of amnesty. We need a president who will put the interests of Americans first.

What was the reaction to Trump’s candidacy throughout the Republican right wing and especially in the Tea Party? As Michael Reagan8 put it, Trump was just “saying what all of us are thinking.” What to those outside seemed like a parade of gaffe after political gaffe was truth-telling for the Tea Party, aimed at both liberal America and the Republican establishment. Trump’s most famous gaffe, from his announcement speech,9 could not have been closer to the Tea Party’s heart.

When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. They’re not sending you. [pointing] They’re not sending you. They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.

The Impasse of Existential Crises

TRUMP WAS TALKING TO what we might call Tea Party 3.0. In its seven years, despite notable backing from wealthy far-right supporters, thousands of spontaneously formed local groups and a handful of national coalitions, the Tea Party remained largely inchoate on an everyday national level. Yet on three occasions, the movement spoke, indeed roared, with a single national voice.
The first occasion, Tea Party 1.0—and what put them on the map as a political force—was the movement’s fierce opposition to Obamacare. The Tea Party came into being in February 2009, a month after Barack Obama’s first inaugural, and by the summer of that year, during the congressional recess, Tea Party members intimidated and overwhelmed congresspeople at town-hall meetings across the country. By January 2010, Tea Party-endorsed Scott Brown won Ted Kennedy’s old Massachusetts senatorial seat, promising to oppose Obamacare.

**Trump was just “saying what all of us are thinking.”**

In the dramas of Tea Party 1.0, the movement enjoyed the backing of the Republican establishment, which had pledged unyielding resistance to Obama policies toward the goal of a one-term presidency. With Tea Party 2.0—the “debt crises” of 2011 and 2013, the latter of which led to a government shutdown—the party establishment demurred: they feared for the business effects of a default on the national debt and the political effects of a government shutdown.

But with Tea Party 3.0, the immigration question, the gulf between the establishment and the movement was unprecedented. For both the Tea Party and for the establishment, immigration raised nothing short of competing and irreconcilable existential crises.

For the Tea Party, and, as it would turn out, a broader swath of the white working class and American nativists, “illegal immigrants” explained the immediate dysfunctions in their environment, like unemployment and fading life chances. But something more profound was going on, a global sense that the country was getting away from them, that their taken-for-granted privileged white identity was getting swamped by minorities from below and minorities arriving in positions of power above both culturally and—Obama!—politically.

As the right-wing political commentator Ann Coulter put it,

*This is not an election about who can check off the most boxes on a conservative policy list, or even about who is the best or nicest person. This is an election about saving the concept of America, an existential election like no other has ever been. Anyone who doesn’t grasp this is part of the problem, not part of the solution.*

On the other side, the establishment side, what the immigration question put into existential crisis was the very future of the Republican Party itself. The party, they understood, lives under a demographic sword of Damocles, as the population of the United States inches more and more heavily minority. They
recognized that what had happened to the Republican Party in California could happen nationally. The state that had given the nation Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan turned reliably blue in state and national elections after the controversy over 1994’s Proposition 187, which would bar “illegal aliens” from using state services including education. Here it is explained by Mitch McConnell, leader of the Senate Republicans, way back in January of 2009, at the dawn of the Obama presidency:

“We’re all concerned about the fact that the very wealthy and the very poor, the most and least educated, and a majority of minority voters seem to have more or less stopped paying attention to us, and we should be concerned that, as a result of all this, the Republican Party seems to be slipping into a position of being more of a regional party than a national one.”

As for 2016? Here is Lindsey Graham, briefly a candidate for the Republican nomination, who lacked any purchase with the Tea Party nationally:

“But if we don’t pass immigration reform, if we don’t get it off the table and in a reasonable, practical way, it doesn’t matter who you run in 2016. We’re in a demographic death spiral as a party. And the only way we can get back in good graces with the Hispanic community, in my view, is to pass comprehensive immigration reform. If you don’t do that, it really doesn’t matter who we run in my view.”

The gap between the party establishment and the Tea Party (in particular its populist base, as we shall see) was irreconcilable. With the immigration issue perceived as existential on both sides—the future of the country versus the future of the party—Donald Trump, the man whose political speeches seem to consist of whatever is on his mind at the moment, had staked his claim to the Tea Party mother lode. His appeal would split the populists in the Tea Party from their free-market conservative partners and realign them with a white working class, which had been indifferent to the Tea Party during its Obama-era run.

---

Tea Party Populism and the New Identity Politics

**OTHERING IS AT THE** heart of populism. The essence of populism is a group antipathy, profoundly felt, toward perceived elites. It is their opposition to the elites, the Other, that gives a populist movement its identity; the
movement is defined by its opposition to the Other. Populists see elites as corrupt, powerful, and ideologically suspect. In American politics, populism of the left takes aim at, and defines itself in relation to, financial elites.

But populism of the right in the United States predominantly defines itself against cultural elites; above all on the populist right, the domestic Other is American liberalism, whose dominant figures are the Democratic Party and its “client base,” the “takers,” largely minorities, who support the party for its “giveaways.” But, among much else, the liberal Other includes Hollywood, university professors, urban life, and a host of patterns of consumption.

The Club for Growth is a wealthy political-action committee that, like the advocacy groups associated with the Koch brothers, has frequently supported Tea Party candidates in the name of free-market absolutist economic policies. In 2004, the Club ran a famous advertisement attacking presidential candidate Howard Dean that prefigured how Tea Party identity was forged by naming the domestic Other and defining itself implicitly in contrast. When a couple, white seniors, in front of their plainly nonurban house—this would turn out to be the core Tea Party demographic—is asked by an announcer their view of Dean’s tax policies, it turns into an occasion to vent on an inventory of associations with the liberal world:

**Man:** What do I think? Well, I think Howard Dean should take his tax-hiking, government-expanding, latte-drinking, sushi-eating, Volvo-driving, New York Times-reading . . .

**Woman:** . . . body-piercing, Hollywood-loving, left-wing freak show back to Vermont where it belongs.

**Man:** Got it?

The Tea Party was prefigured in the 2008 vice-presidential campaign of Sarah Palin. Palin’s rallies were often raucous occasions, where attendees evoked a devotion to the candidate nowhere to be found at rallies for John McCain, who was running at the head of the ticket.

While many Americans were baffled by the contrast between Sarah Palin’s political ambitions and what appeared to them to be her stark lack of qualification for higher office, for her supporters, her qualifications boiled down to what she embodied: “She is one of us.” Her appearance at the highest levels of public office was seen as a providential deliverance. And her message about Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama was plain: “He’s not one of us.” He was the Other.

In the early months of the Tea Party, Palin was the movement’s most revered national politician. She had given the movement an identity that endured beyond her vice-presidential campaign; the Tea Partiers called themselves what she had christened them: the “real Americans.” It is no accident
that on January 19, 2016, Palin became the earliest big-name Republican to endorse Trump. Nor is it an accident that even sympathetic observers found her endorsement speech rambling, bizarre, and often incoherent, as befitting the national political figure who most prefigured Trump.

Palin had ushered in an inverted version of identity politics, which remained at the core of the Tea Party movement. Typically, in American politics, identity movements have been the province of minority constituencies and have, in effect, demanded a seat at the table. Minorities and women experienced themselves as systematically kept from the seats of power and well-being and justice that others—those at the American table—took for granted.

The “real Americans,” in contrast, were objecting to how the new-fangled presence of the Others at the table made them feel—that they and their values had become marginalized. If earlier identity politics involved the sense of being locked out—never having been empowered—Tea Party identity politics was about the feeling of dispossession—having their sense of power and entitlement taken away. The “real American” experience is of an internal diaspora in their homeland. The Tea Party’s most enduring expression of their political mission is “taking our country back.”

Populism and Free-Market Absolutism

LOOKING BACK FURTHER IN US history, the Tea Party is the descendent of other notable uprisings of right-wing populism. For example, right-wing populism was influential in the imposition of Prohibition, the ban on the sale of alcohol in the United States between 1919 and 1933. Then “demon rum” explained the dysfunctions owing to immigration, urbanization, and industrialization that abounded in the country in the early twentieth century.

Populism also rose up against the teaching of evolution in the schools, as this contradicted the fundamentalist; that is, the literalist’s word-for-word interpretation of the Bible. With the repeal of Prohibition and the reverses of the famous Scopes “monkey trial,” right-wing populism lay largely dormant for decades on the national stage.

The sixties reawakened right-wing populism in the United States. Fundamental premises and power relations of traditional worldviews seemed threatened as never before: race (the civil-rights movement); gender (the women’s movement, the gay movement); patriotism (the antiwar movement); religion (legalization of abortion and banning prayer in public schools); morality (drugs, sex, and rock and roll).

The traditional world, the world as they had known it, had begun to tremble beneath their feet. In the 1970s free-market absolutists and populist
traditionalists came together in the conservative movement that rose to national power by the end of that decade in the election of Ronald Regan as president, and dominated American politics for the next twenty-five years.

Conservatism seemed to have run aground with the disasters—Iraq, Katrina, the financial crisis—of the Bush administration. Sam Tanenhaus, one of this country’s foremost chroniclers of our right wing, published The Death of Conservatism in 2009. And yet, once again, free-market absolutists and populists of the right made common cause, coming together once more in a powerful movement, the Tea Party, but this time with a level of radical-

... her message about Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama was plain: “He’s not one of us.” He was the Other.

ness only seen earlier on the fringes of the conservative movement.

Free-market absolutism arose, especially among conservative corporate elites, in opposition to the policies of the New Deal under Franklin Roosevelt. It has formed the economic ideology of the conservative movement that has worked since the 1930s to dominate the Republican Party and change the direction of social policy in the United States away from New Deal liberalism and its successors.

Despite their role in the conservative movement’s domination of American politics since 1980, free-market absolutists found themselves consistently unhappy with the concessions and compromises of conservative politicians in power, maintaining their sense of themselves as insurgents within the party. This sentiment paralleled a similar resentment among right populists, like evangelical Christians, that the Republican Party pandered to their views in electoral campaigns but rarely delivered on their issues once in office.

As Garry Wills observed: “The sense of betrayal by one’s own is a continuing theme in the Republican Party.” (A Fox News poll in September 2015 found that 62 percent of Republicans feel “betrayed” by their own party’s officeholders.)

Operating through such organizations as Americans for Prosperity and FreedomWorks, free-market absolutists mobilized quickly to exploit the 2008 financial crisis to further their long-term goals of lowering taxes to a bare minimum, dismantling the American welfare state, including Social Security and Medicare, and routing labor unionism. These activists saw in the financial crisis a historic opportunity to score a decisive victory in their long-running history of trying to supplant Keynesian economics with the doctrines of Hayek, Friedman, and Laffer.

They swiftly seized on the “Tea Party” theme, creating national networks, often internet-based, which convened regularly and coordinated with conservative mass media in the United States. As Tea Party groups sprang up by the
thousands across the country, these right-wing power brokers offered financial, strategic, and political assistance to many of these new organizations, and helped raise some local leaders (especially those focused on fiscal issues) to national prominence.

The activist constituency of the Tea Party—the people who attended meetings, participated in Tea Party websites, and are the most dedicated primary voters—is overwhelmingly white, middle class, and late middle-aged (fifty to seventy years old). The financial crisis, with its accompanying huge drop in the value of people’s homes, created a panic among this constituency that their relatively stable and secure economic condition might suddenly be in jeopardy.

Tea Partiers, the “real Americans,” see themselves as those who have worked hard all their lives, earned everything they have, and view liberals, unions, and often minorities as forces trying to take away what they possess and redistribute it to the “undeserving,” the poor who haven’t worked hard, who pine in the Tea Party’s view for a life of government dependency. This sentiment led to a profound convergence between the populist base and the free-market absolutists. That liberal social policy now seemed to Tea Partiers as an attempt to take away their economic security, meshed perhaps as never before with the free-market absolutists’ goal of doing away with the welfare state. As we shall see, this convergence held the Tea Party together until the 2016 campaign when it too has been sundered—a split given voice by the Trump campaign.

But back in 2009, the election of a Democratic president—an African American Democratic president—turned the panic deriving from the financial and housing crisis into a political movement. The long-standing resentment of Democratic “cultural elitism”—the sense on the populist right that liberals “think they know better and want to tell us how to live our lives” combined with the fear of economic dispossession—taking away what “we” have and giving it to “them,” the Other, the takers—to produce a motivation powerful enough to mobilize millions under the Tea Party banner.

From the point of view of the populist right, the liberal elite has long been associated with a client base—a force felt pushing from the bottom—the poor, the working poor, welfare recipients, and, often, minorities. This perception paralleled a classic form of left American populism, called producerism, where the populists saw themselves trapped in a vice, squeezed from top and bottom by parasitic forces which lived off the populists’ hard work. Above were economic elites: bankers and monopolists. Below were the lazy and shiftless.

In effect, for populists of the right in 2009, for the emerging Tea Party voters, the election of a black president and the assumption of power by the liberal Democratic Party transformed the vice-like effect they had felt in their perceived alliance of elite liberals and the “underclass.” Now, both
the liberal elite and their client base were on top! The experience was less one of being squeezed between top and bottom, but rather one of being flattened from above, by an Other more powerful than ever before. As one Tea Party activist put it, “The people I was looking for [as a policeman] are now running the government.”

Resentment and Contempt

**RESENTMENT IS THE CLASSIC** emotion associated with populist movements. The modern investigation of the place of resentment in politics dates back to Nietzsche’s treatment of *resentment* in his *On the Genealogy of Morality*. Nietzsche’s famous division between nobles, slaves, and priests highlights the hierarchical component necessarily involved in the feeling of resentment. Resentment is anger directed at those perceived as above oneself or one’s class. Contempt is anger directed at those people or classes seen as below.

As a general principle, when populist resentment, especially on the right, gets mobilized into a political movement, the resentment felt toward elites is transformed into contempt. Emotionally, this is the step, the flip-flop, that empowers the movement to act, that enables it, psychologically, to confront the Other. It is the cure for the pervasive and festering one-down sensitivity that is resentment’s characteristic mood. On December 7, 2015, in the first round of its regional elections, France’s far-right National Front had an historic electoral breakthrough, outpolling both of the established conservative and socialist parties. That evening, the movement’s leader, Marine Le Pen, observed:

> I believe that the National Front’s incredible results are the revolt of the people against the elite. The people no longer support the disdain they have been (subjected to) for years by a political class defending its own interests.

In America, much of the play of one-up/one-down takes place over questions of intelligence and education. The Tea Party right is acutely aware of, and deeply resents, an attitude in the liberal world that regards them as the backward, almost premodern, fraction of American society. In popular culture, this attitude is perhaps nowhere better expressed than in the television show Real Time with Bill Maher, which is relentless in its characterization of the American right as ignorant and superstitious. A typical, if understated example: “I’ll show you Obama’s birth certificate when you show me Sarah Palin’s high-school diploma.”
By asserting over and over that he is smarter than his competition—either Democratic or Republican—Trump hits this deeply felt chord of resentment on the Republican populist right. Turning the tables on the educated liberal elite by claiming superior intelligence is by now a long-established trope on the right among talk-show opinion leaders who have developed extremely loyal followings. Rush Limbaugh,32 long the master of this medium, regularly offers his listeners (his “dittoheads”) variations on the following:

Greetings, conversationalists across the fruited plain, this is Rush Limbaugh, the most dangerous man in America, with the largest hypothalamus in North America, serving humanity simply by opening my mouth...doing this show with half my brain tied behind my back just to make it fair because I have talent on loan from...God.

Michael Savage,33 one of Limbaugh’s major competitors, takes this one step further, as indicated in his book Liberalism is a Mental Disorder. These tropes are a daily constant on Tea Party blogs.

As with his over-the-top emphasis on immigration as the defining issue of his campaign, Trump hit another sweet spot for mobilizing Tea Party support. By putting down the elites—which, for Trump includes the Republican establishment—on grounds of intelligence, Trump flips Tea Party and other populist resentment into contempt.

Tea Party blogs to this day regularly recall with resentment a 2008 phrase then-candidate Obama uttered at a fundraiser in that most liberal quarter of the United States, San Francisco, to characterize what happens to people in deindustrialized small towns in America:

They get bitter, they cling to guns or religion or antipathy to people who aren’t like them or anti-immigrant sentiment or anti-trade sentiment as a way to explain their frustrations.

Here is Sarah Palin in her endorsement speech for Trump, flipping “bitter and clinging” from a trope of resentment to one of contempt, this time directed at the Republican establishment:

Now they’re concerned about this ideological purity? Give me a break! Who are they to say that? Oh, and tell somebody like Phyllis Schlafly. She is the Republican, conservative movement icon and hero and a Trump supporter. Tell her she’s not conservative. How about the rest of us? Right wingin’, bitter, clingin’, proud clingers of our guns, our God and our religions, and our Constitution. Tell us that we’re not red enough? Yeah, coming from the establishment. Right.
Hard-Hat Populism

BY LATE SUMMER, TRUMP’S commanding lead over the Republican field began to yield to the rise of black neurosurgeon-turned-presidential candidate Ben Carson. What happened here was that Tea Party voters, after the first blush of enthusiasm for Trump, began to see more of themselves in Carson than in Trump, especially after their presentations at the Family Research Council’s Values Voters Summit in September.

And they were not mistaken in this. Despite his success in basing his campaign irresistibly on the hottest of Tea Party hot buttons, Trump comes from a populist lineage distinct from that of the Tea Party’s largely exurban and evangelical base. Rather, Trump’s is a notably urban populism. It is the “hard-hat” populism that famously showed its face in New York City when construction workers attacked antiwar protesters during the Vietnam War. It is the vein of urban resentment that was exposed in the presidential campaigns of George Wallace, which would be relabeled by Richard Nixon as the “silent majority”—a phrase Trump has fittingly resurrected—and transformed a few years later into “Reagan Democrats.”

And it is a populism Trump comes by honestly. Trump’s father, who made the family’s first real-estate fortune building middle-class housing in Brooklyn and Queens, taught his son the business. This meant dealing with contractors, laborers, building superintendents, and renters, and it is Trump’s adoption of their Archie Bunker-like manner and mores that marks his political style. There is long-standing cultural and political resentment—it goes back at least to the administration of Mayor John Lindsay—outer-borough New Yorkers feel for the Manhattan “elites.” In effect, if the Tea Party’s populism is the populism of “fly-over country”—the America that feels ignored by the elites of the East and West Coasts—Trump’s populism reflects the resentments of “fly-over New York.”

The “real American” identity is worn more lightly among urban populists than among Tea Partiers; it is less of a total identity. Nor does the urban populist share all the Tea Party populist’s concerns. One example is the Tea Party’s widespread rejection of science, like evolution or climate change. When Carson invoked the Bible as a guide to history, as in his suggestion that the Egyptian pyramids were grain silos, he endeared himself to the evangelical base in a way foreign to Trump-style populism.

The urban populist is nowhere as exercised over the “gay agenda” as his Tea Party brethren. Nor are second-amendment questions as vital. The urban populist does not follow the Tea Party down some of the paths that seem oddest, even paranoid, to American liberals, like the conviction that the Obama government plans to disarm Americans, or that US military exercises, like Jade Helm, were designed to impose martial law on a red state like Texas.
Toward the end of 2015, Carson faltered. A combination of his mild personality and his plain lack of knowledge of foreign affairs seemed to take the air out of his campaign, and his poll numbers began a steady decline. In his rise and fall, Carson resembled the Tea Party favorites of the 2012 primary campaign. But that was 2016’s last semblance of the 2012 model. In fact, by the time voting began in February 2016, the 2012 model had been turned on its head. Instead of a series of Tea Party candidates chasing the establishment favorite, the 2016 race turned into a handful of establishment candidates chasing a pair of Tea Party favorites, Trump and Texas Senator Ted Cruz.

The Tea Party right is acutely aware of, and deeply resents, an attitude in the liberal world that regards them as the backward, almost premodern, fraction of American society.

Muslims and the Emergence of the Strong Man

In 2011 Trump flirted with the idea of entering the presidential race to oppose Barack Obama. His was a peculiar trial balloon. He became the country’s most prominent proponent of “birtherism”—the crackpot notion that Barack Obama was not born in the United States. Succinctly put, in a country that had become sufficiently “postracial” that explicit attacks on Obama for being African American were beyond the pale, birtherism emerged as the primary vehicle for expressing racial unhappiness at Obama’s accession to the office of the presidency. This was Othering at its most straightforward. And given the constitutional prohibition against a foreign-born president, it allows its adherents to dismiss Obama’s entire presidency as illegitimate.

Closely related to birtherism was distrust of Obama’s Christianity and the belief that he was a secret Muslim. Polls in Alabama and Mississippi in advance of their primary elections in 2012 found that only 12 and 14 percent of Republicans respectively believed Obama to be a Christian. As late as September 2015, 43 percent of Republicans nationally believed Obama was a secret Muslim according to a CNN/ORC survey.

In the worldview of Obama as Other, Obama as Muslim added a venomous dimension to the illegitimacy owing to his “foreignness.” In this thinking, the Muslim world was the successor to the great American enemies of the twentieth century: Fascism and Communism. In a mind-set that sees the United States engaged in an epic battle against the Muslim world, against an asymmetrical enemy that operates via terrorism, this puts Obama (and liberalism
generally) on the side of the enemy. They are the enemy on the home front. The domestic Other meets the foreign Other.

Five days after San Bernardino (and two weeks after Paris), having watched his lead in the polls soften, Trump called for a “total and complete shutdown” of Muslims entering the United States until we “figure out what’s going on.” The response to this reprised, and in many ways exceeded, the response to Trump’s attack on Mexicans and his proposal to build a border wall in his campaign announcement speech.

On the one hand, the political and commentating classes were again dumbfounded. Trump’s opponents for the Republican nomination and virtually the whole of the Republican establishment responded with sharp criticism. But this time the criticism turned darker. Trump’s scapegoating now brought forth considerations of the relationship of his politics to fascism. Martin O’Malley twice called Trump a fascist in Democratic presidential debates. Conservative writers wondered whether looking at the history of fascism might explain a bit of what was going on with Trump. New attention was drawn to Trump’s support, often enthusiastic, on white supremacist and neo-Nazi websites. Trump, himself, dithered before rejecting the support of unrepentant Ku Klux Klansman David Duke, though he found nothing wrong with having retweeted a quotation from Mussolini he found particularly congenial. His call at a March rally for hands raised to pledge support for him created a tableau that conjured up a Hitler rally for many observers. And, most telling, Trump consistently spoke approvingly of violently handling protesters at his rallies and defended violence by his supporters when it, inevitably, made its appearance.

Yet on the other hand, the Republican base responded to Trump’s call to halt Muslim immigration with a new round of enthusiasm. Once again Tea Partiers felt as though he was channeling their thoughts. And Trump rose higher in national Republican polls than ever before, establishing a twenty-point cushion between himself and his nearest rival, Ted Cruz. Trump maintained this lead throughout the primaries. As Trump began rolling up delegate margins, national conversations broke out over the possibility of a brokered Republican convention.

Splitting the Evangelicals, Splitting the Tea Party

ONE AFTER ANOTHER, THE establishment candidates failed. Jeb Bush’s campaigning seemed to confirm Trump’s belittling of him as “low-energy.” Chris Christie’s tough-guy appeal proved no match for Trump’s eccentric high-wire mastery of those arts. Ironically, with Jeb Bush out of the race,
Marco Rubio became the establishment’s great hope to beat Trump for the nomination; ironic, because Rubio had arrived in the Senate in 2010 as a Tea Party candidate. But he was never able to repair his breach with the Tea Party around his early work in the Senate, trying to collaborate on immigration reform.

**They are the enemy on the home front.**

**The domestic Other meets the foreign Other.**

Rubio was undressed by his hollow and repeated word-for-word repetition of talking points at the hands of Chris Christie in a debate preceding Super Tuesday. This was a humiliation from which Rubio never recovered, though he attempted to do so by turning from his choir-boy persona to meeting Trump in the latter’s gutter speech, including, finally, penis-size remarks.

Once the voting began, for the Republican establishment, the likelihood of a Trump nomination gathered momentum with the seeming horror and inevitability of a Greek tragedy. The remaining establishment possibility, Ohio Governor John Kasich, was never taken seriously as a winner by the Republican establishment, though with the walls closing in on them, they hoped he might win enough delegates to throw the convention into a deadlock.

Cruz, an extreme Tea Party conservative and evangelical, whose entire political career deeply alienated the party establishment, based his electoral strategy in the primaries on dominating the evangelical vote. As the Greek tragedy unfolded, establishment figures began reluctantly endorsing Cruz as a means to deny Trump the nomination.

Yet Trump, the thrice-married vulgarian, again confounded analysts by holding his own against Cruz, with polls showing an almost fifty-fifty split among evangelicals. Some point to the distinctions among evangelicals in religiosity and church attendance. Others suggest that a historic sense of confusion among evangelicals has them seeking a strong leader. Ben Carson endorsed Trump after dropping out of the race. So, too, Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell Jr.

Trump has also split the Tea Party, perhaps irrevocably. The populist and free-market absolutist forces that came together to form the Tea Party turned severely at odds with one another, and daily fierce debates on Tea Party websites and on talk radio rage between supporters of Cruz and supporters of Trump. Cruz supporters argued in terms of fidelity to conservative principles:

> Real conservatives have a message for the Trump campaign. We are conservatives first and then Republicans. We are Republicans because the party is allegedly the conservative party.
Exasperated, the Cruz supporters argued:

Trump’s deranged rantings make any sane person question what he would do when he had the power of the federal government behind him. If you insult the Donald, are you going to have the IRS knocking at your door? There is something Trump supporters need to realize. He is playing you...If you are a Donald Trump supporter, he is marketing to your outrage, not to any notion of liberty, freedom, or conservatism.

And the pro-Trump Tea Partiers? The populist Partiers?

Cruz [is a] politician...Smooth talking fraud...Donald Trump is the one that will help to bring this country back...Looking at how divided this room is should frighten all of us...Hearing that Donald is going to build up the Republican Party should tell you a lot... WE NEED DONALD TRUMP ...He will be our Patton, Eisenhower, et cetera; he will be strong, and he will get done what he has promised ... Illegals, the wall, China, Mexico, the economy, jobs, ISIS, and protecting our country from all evil and sharia law ... If you elect Cruz ... you will be condoning everything Obama has done while in office ... and you’re getting politics as usual ...

The End of the Republican Coalition?

LIKE THE CRUZ ADVOCATES in the Tea Party, what agonizes the Republican establishment most profoundly is Trump’s considerable deviation from the very cornerstones of modern conservative ideology: free markets, free trade, neoconservative foreign policy. Trump does not share mainline American conservatism’s contempt for the welfare state; he even speaks well of universal health care. He is an unabashed fan of government use of eminent domain. His unrelenting use of lawsuits in both business and politics makes a mockery of establishment Republicans long-held animus toward “the trial lawyers.”

In foreign affairs, although he is for a no-holds-barred approach to ISIS (e.g., waterboarding and more; going after terrorists’ families, he is contemptuous of neoconservatism’s signature endeavor: the invasion of Iraq. He has even breached the taboo about criticizing George Bush for allowing the 9/11 attacks on his watch.
The redoubling of Trump’s support when he added Muslims to Mexicans, as those he would use exceptional measures to keep outside the country’s borders, confirms that the populist-establishment existential standoff over immigration has been the most significant through line of the Republican nominating race.

Trump’s criticism of free-trade agreements proved essential to his enduring appeal throughout the primaries. The economic dispossession of the white working class has been a forty-year wave that seems, in politics, to have broken this electoral cycle. A widely publicized study published in December 2015 showed that epidemic rates of suicide and substance abuse—alcohol, heroin, and prescription opioids—have combined to increase the mortality rate for whites between the ages of forty-five and fifty-four, with high-school education or less, in a manner paralleled “only [by] HIV/AIDS in contemporary times.”

As with evangelicals, Trump’s hard-hat populism has proven to have profound crossover appeal (“I love the poorly educated”) with this demographic, which one might label the Joe-the-Plumber populists. Trump’s appeal with white working-class men has held up in the polls and in the primary voting. In effect, we have watched his hard-hat populist base expand.

The redoubling of Trump’s support when he added Muslims to Mexicans, as those he would use exceptional measures to keep outside the country’s borders, confirms that the populist-establishment existential standoff over immigration has been the most significant through line of the Republican nominating race. Trump’s appeal—one is tempted to call it Trumpism—expands the party’s potential base by upping its support among the white working class. This is ironic, since the establishment’s support for immigration reform was based on the party’s need to expand its base—by including Latinos. But it is doubtful, as the party’s establishment recognizes, that even a robust expansion of the Joe-the-Plumber demographic will keep pace with minority growth in the American electorate.

But the movement of the white working class toward Trumpism is significant in its own right. One is reminded of the migration of working-class voters from the French Communist Party to the anti-immigrant National Front in the 1990s. It appeared that, finally, the French working class wore its ideology lightly. Italian political observers have used the term epidermic (epidermico)—we might say skin deep—to understand the transition of political actors who move suddenly from left to right. As though an apparent decades-long ideological commitment can, suddenly, be discarded and even its opposite taken on.

For decades no problem has befuddled progressives more than why white working-class voters seem consistently to vote against their own interests
by their support of Republicans: the book What’s the Matter with Kansas? famously explored this question. “The chickens voting for Colonel Sanders” has expressed it popularly. Trump’s support among the white working class, their rejection of the Republican establishment, suggests that their commitment to Republican ideology all this time might have been of the epidermic variety—as it seemed readily discarded in favor of Trumpism. And if it was not the ideology that kept them in the Republican fold since the days of Ronald Reagan, what was it?

The likely conclusion is that, prior to Trumpism, the available alternative, liberalism—the Democratic elites and their minority “clients”—was even more disagreeable, often viscerally more so, than their unhappiness with the failure of the Republicans to come through for them. Why were the chickens voting for Colonel Sanders all that time? It would seem it was how distasteful the domestic Other was all along.

The Republican primary season has established Donald Trump as the party’s presumptive presidential nominee for the general election. A Trumpian Republican Party resembles less the Reagan-coalition party of the past thirty-five years than the European far-right anti-immigrant parties that have agitated at the edges of national power, and sometimes more in countries like Hungary and Poland, since the end of the Cold War. These are parties that, in the name of anti-immigrant resentment, as with Marine Le Pen’s French National Front, have long inveighed against Europe’s established political classes.

Like the Northern League in Italy, the UK Independence Party in Britain, or the Freedom Party in the Netherlands, these populist parties have never been followers of the free-market ideology that has seemed until now to be the very bedrock of Republican identity and ideology, the sine qua non of American conservatism.

If the Trump Republican Party defies the long odds against it (as Trump’s primary campaign has done) and prevails in the general election, this will become the new face of the Republican Party going forward. If Trump and the Republicans lose, and especially if much of the Party’s down-ticket candidates are taken down along with the national ticket, the party’s future will be a battle royale, the likes of which have not been seen in American politics since the crises over slavery that gave rise to the Republican Party 160 years ago, and which may give rise to a novel political confection which even now, as Yeats put it, “Slouches toward Bethlehem to be born.”
REFERENCES

3. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1rpsCvbono
17. http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2008/10/17/palin_clarifies_her_pro-america.html
22. ibid.
23. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/post/republicans-had-it-in-for-obama-before-day-1/2012/08/10/0c96c7c8-e31f-11e1-ae7f-d2a13e249eb2_blog.html
29. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/03/opinion/campaign-stops/is-donald-trump-a-fascist.html?_r=0
Migration, Austerity, and Crisis at the Periphery of Europe

Ilaria Giglioli
Photography by Stylianos Papardelas

Over the past five years, two key social justice questions have emerged in the European Union. On one hand, as a result of the Eurozone crisis and related austerity measures, poverty and inequality have dramatically increased in southern Europe. On the other hand, the intensification of the “refugee crisis” that started in early 2011 has led to increasing numbers of deaths of people attempting to cross the Mediterranean, and has brought back to the forefront latent xenophobia throughout the European Union.
IN DIFFERENT WAYS, BOTH of these questions — the economic crisis and austerity on one hand, and the “refugee crisis” on the other — raise the broader problem of who fully “belongs” in Europe. In other words, whose social and economic rights are to be respected? Who can access the basic premises for the building of a dignified life?

This paper analyzes how the combination of austerity measures on one hand and the refugee crisis on the other are drawing differential lines of exclusion in Europe. After documenting these lines of exclusion and their effects on people’s daily lives, the paper analyzes different political movements and parties that are emerging in response to the economic crisis.

The paper argues that in order to create a more fair and inclusive notion of Europe, it is necessary not only to defend and reinstate social-protection systems that are currently being dismantled by austerity, but also challenge longer term notions of who fully “belongs” in Europe. In other words, it is necessary to couple advocacy for social and economic rights with a commitment to challenge longer term dynamics of exclusion along lines of citizenship, ethnicity, and religion.

What Is Austerity?

OVER THE PAST HALF decade, various European countries have been experiencing one of the most dramatic economic crises of the past century. As the effects of the 2007–2009 US subprime mortgage crisis and the 2007–2008 financial crisis rippled across the Atlantic, various fiscally stressed states were forced to borrow heavily in order to keep their banks afloat, leading to an increased accumulation of public debts. Between 2010 and 2011, three states (Greece, Portugal, and Ireland) became insolvent, requiring a bailout package from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund, while Spain and Italy were also at risk.¹

As a condition for bailout funds, these countries were forced to cut public spending and increase government revenue by passing a series of austerity measures. While these were primarily implemented in the southern European countries most affected by the sovereign debt crisis, similar measures were also taken in other parts of the European Union, most notably in the United Kingdom under David Cameron’s government.

Austerity is an umbrella term that includes a range of different policies sharing the stated aim of reducing public spending, increasing government revenues, and reducing the cost of labor in order to make countries more attractive to private investment. Although policies have varied from country to country, they have generally included measures such as reform to the pension system (e.g., raising the pensionable age, cutting pensions), cuts to health care and social services, increases in regressive taxes (such as VAT), and the liberalization of the labor market (though, among other things, the erosion of collective bargaining power).²

While the weight of these policies varied from country to country, depending on their precrisis economic condition and their existing social-protection mechanisms, they have generally led to an increase in poverty and inequality, including both increased numbers of people living in poverty and intensification of poverty.³ While the economic crisis and austerity measures have affected various EU countries, this paper
focuses specifically on Spain, Greece, and Italy—countries that have been at the forefront of the “refugee crisis” and that have also seen the emergence of the largest anti-austerity movements and parties.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND OF AUSTERITY MEASURES

The main consequences of the crisis and related austerity policies have been an increase in poverty and inequality. Even if austerity policies were to help relaunch the private sector, as their proponents suggest, they would create a highly inequitable growth. The increase in poverty is mainly due to unemployment, to changes in working conditions (e.g., decrease of the minimum wage, increase of flexible and precarious forms of employment), and to pension cuts.

Regarding the first point, in 2013 the unemployment rate across the European Union was 11 percent, or twenty-six million people. A high proportion of this unemployment is long term, which—depending on the national welfare system—may lead to the loss of unemployment benefits. Among the unemployed, youth have been the most affected throughout southern Europe (Italy, Spain, Greece).

In addition to unemployment, all these countries have also seen a rise in the number of working poor. The reasons for the increase of this category are multiple, ranging from the increased use of temporary contracts to working for multiple months without receiving a salary, as well as cuts to minimum wage enforced as part of austerity measures, and to a general fall in the real value of wages.

Finally, cuts to pensions—such as the deindexation of pensions from cost-of-living variations that was imposed as part of austerity packages in Italy—have had multiplier effects on poverty, as often pensioners’ incomes provide support for other family members. In some cases, one person’s pension is the only source of income of an extended family. Some examples of the manifestation of poverty in daily life are the inability of households to afford winter heating in Greece, extended families moving in together in Spain to save on costs, and increased homelessness of divorced men in Italy, who are unable to both support their former spouse and children and provide housing for themselves.

Overall, the Spanish Red Cross has seen the numbers of people who make use of its emergency assistance program rise from 900,000 to 2.4 million in only four years.

The increase in poverty has gone hand in hand with an increase in inequality. In both Greece and Spain, countries that have suffered the effects of the crisis and of austerity measures most severely in terms of unemployment, the last half decade has been characterized by extreme social polarization. In Greece, the top 20 percent of the population can rely on a disposable income (posttax) of 41,000 euros per year, while the bottom 20 percent earns less than 7,317 euros per year. This situation is similar to Spain, where the income of the top 20 percent of earners is over seven times more than the lowest 20 percent.

The increase in poverty and in inequality is exacerbated by cutbacks to social services, implemented as part of austerity policies. Alongside pensions and unemployment benefits, health spending has been cut throughout countries implementing austerity policies, ranging from increases in copays in Italy to the tying of health care to employment in some parts of Spain.
The banking and debt crisis are transforming into a social and public-health crisis without precedent in the last fifty years in western Europe.

In essence, the banking and debt crisis are transforming into a social and public-health crisis without precedent in the last fifty years in western Europe.

If, as this section has shown, the effects of the crisis and austerity measures have been experienced by the population of southern Europe at large, non-EU citizens have been particularly hard hit. Before exploring this in more detail, however, it is necessary to understand the broader context of migration to southern Europe, which has most recently come to international attention through the “refugee crisis.”

The “Refugee Crisis”

NUMBERS AND CONTEXT

The arrival of migrants to Europe by boat is not a new phenomenon. As the Schengen Agreement implemented in the mid-1990s allowed for freedom of movement within the European Union, many European countries tightened their border controls and implemented more restrictive visa policies. As the pathways to travel to Europe became more limited, undocumented migration rose as other alternatives to enter the European Union were no longer available. In this context, the arrival of migrants by sea became more common.

These crossings further intensified in the aftermath of the uprisings in the southern and eastern Mediterranean in early 2011, due to both the increase in armed violence in some countries (such as Syria and Libya) and to the decreased surveillance of North African coasts. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, in fact, both Tunisia and Libya had signed migration-control accords with the European Union. However, the political void that characterized the first months of 2011 in Tunisia allowed for over 20,000 migrants to leave the country’s shores. Similarly, ongoing instability in Libya led to a decreased control of the country’s coasts, allowing migrant-smuggling operations to flourish there.

The numbers of migrants and refugees who have attempted to cross the Mediterranean over the past year have been substantial. According to the International Organization for Migration, in 2015 over a million migrants and refugees arrived at European shores. In the first two months of 2016, almost 130,000 migrants and refugees had already crossed the Mediterranean, reaching the total number of 2014 arrivals in only nine weeks. Asylum seekers originate mainly from Syria and Sub-Saharan Africa (Eritrea, Somalia, Nigeria, Mali, Gambia, Senegal). The dangers of Mediterranean crossings are extreme, making the Mediterranean the global border region with the highest mortality rate. In 2014, more than 3,200 migrants died while attempting to cross the Mediterranean. In 2015, the numbers had risen to 3,800. By the end of March 2016, over 700 migrants had already died.
### Table 1. Unemployment, Poverty, and Austerity Measures in Southern Europe

Source: Eurostat; Caritas Europa, The European Crisis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Italy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unemployment</strong></td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Youth unemployment</strong></td>
<td>53.2%</td>
<td>52.4%</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>People at risk of poverty or social exclusion</strong></td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>In-work population at risk of poverty</strong>&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Main austerity measures

- Cuts to the health system.
- Reduction in compensation for unfair dismissal.
- Cut in unemployment benefits.
- Increase in VAT.
- Changes in procedures for collective redundancy.
- Pension reform (e.g., reduction of pensions, increase in pensionable age).
- Cuts to the health system.
- Increase in VAT.
- Reduction of minimum wage.
- Reduction in unemployment benefits.
- Cuts to public servant wages.
- Weakening of collective bargaining.
- Pension reform (e.g., deindexation from cost of living, increase in pensionable age).
- New taxes (e.g., property, financial assets, financial transactions).
- Cuts to social and health services.

<sup>*</sup> Percentage of population over eighteen.
POLITICAL CLIMATE

The arrival of migrants and asylum seekers has attracted considerable political attention, both in the countries where they land and within the European Union more broadly. Due to present migration routes, the bulk of refugees have been landing in Greece and in southern Italy, two of the areas that have suffered most profoundly from the economic crisis and from austerity measures.

While there have been examples of solidarity from local inhabitants toward the migrants, there have also been occasions of hostility. This is particularly the case in contexts where a populist right-wing discourse frames migrants and refugees as a liability to countries that are already struggling with the effects of austerity.33

In addition to these local dynamics, additional tensions have also emerged between different European countries on the management of refugees who arrived on the continent’s southern coasts. Germany’s agreement to resettle large numbers of Syrian refugees within its borders is a relatively new development. Previously, different northwestern European countries have been reluctant to play a role in the crisis, whether by providing logistical and financial aid to Italy and Greece or by resettling some migrants and refugees. Regarding

FIGURE 1. MAIN MIGRANT ROUTES TO EUROPE, 2015

Source: http://tracks.unhcr.org/2015/07/the-sea-route-to-europe/
the former, the Italian naval operation Mare Nostrum was suspended in December 2014 due to the lack of funding support from other European countries, leading to a spike in numbers of deaths at sea in early 2015.24 Regarding the latter, due to European refugee regulations (and specifically the Dublin system),25 refugees are required to apply for asylum in the EU country of first entry, thus putting considerable strain on countries at the southern border of Europe, such as Italy and Greece.

While local and national governments in Italy have repeatedly stressed that the arrival of migrants and refugees is a European problem,26 various northwestern European countries have been reluctant to participate in migrant resettlement schemes, as they claim that southern European countries take a much lower number of refugees. In some cases, northwestern European countries have also temporarily closed their borders to prevent the passage of non-EU migrants who had arrived to southern Europe. This happened repeatedly at the Ventimiglia land border between France and Italy.27 As discussions over refugee and asylum seeker resettlement have progressed, many Eastern European countries have also expressed their reluctance to participate in these schemes.28

Reactions to the current “refugee crisis” at the local, national, and EU level cannot be fully understood without situating it within the broader framework of discussions about immigration in many European countries. In this regard, throughout the continent, the last decade has seen a general increase in hostility both toward new migrants and toward longtime residents and citizens of non-European descent. This hostility emerges in explicitly xenophobic movements (e.g., the marches against the “Islamification” of Germany)29 and also in claims of various mainstream European politicians about the “failure of multiculturalism.”30

At a day-to-day level, it emerges in tensions around access to jobs and welfare. This is clearly visible in the words of an unemployed Italian man, who complained to researchers about what he perceived as the preferential treatment of non-EU migrants in accessing resources: “If you go to the municipality, they tell you they are in the red...Maybe if an immigrant goes they will help him...I don't think it is right because they should help Italians first, and then if there is something left over...I am not racist, god forbid...but...when you have a family, if I have an apple and there are five of us, I divide it in five parts. Then, if there is something left over and someone else, I give it to him, but I give the pieces to the family first...”31

By drawing the distinction between “us” and “them” along lines of nationality, these words point to a broader political climate in which the question of who fully “belongs” in Europe as a full subject entitled to rights and protections is still a highly contentious one.

The following section explores the intersection of austerity measures and migration in more detail, addressing firstly the specific way in which crisis and austerity measures are affecting non-EU migrants, and secondly the ways in which different antiausterity movements are addressing migration.
Crisis, Austerity, and Migration

EFFECTS OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND AUSTERITY ON NON-EU MIGRANTS

If the effects of the crisis and austerity are felt throughout the social body of southern European countries, non-EU migrants are affected in particularly strong ways. The main ones are increased unemployment, consequent loss of residency papers, and cuts to integration policies. Regarding the first point, according to Caritas, in the aftermath of the crisis throughout Europe, non-EU migrants are about twice as likely to be unemployed than EU nationals, and this unemployment is often extended over multiple months and even years.\(^3\)

Within this general pattern, there is considerable variation within countries. In Italy, the disparity in employment between migrants and Italian citizens has remained approximately the same, as the unemployment rates for both categories have risen simultaneously.\(^3\) In Spain, on the other hand, migrant workers were disproportionately hit by the crisis as many of them were employed in the construction sector, which was substantially brought to a halt after the burst of the construction bubble.\(^3\)

The rise in unemployment has particularly serious effects on migrants whose residency status is contingent on employment, as is the case in Italy. Both Caritas and the Red Cross have noted that the proportion of migrants who have become undocumented has greatly increased among their assisted population.\(^3\) Cuts in welfare implemented
as part of austerity packages (such as cuts or limitation to unemployment benefits) have particularly affected non-EU migrants, who often are not able to rely on extended-family support networks.

The lived experience of the crisis, the risk of the loss of residence papers, and the absence of a safety net is captured by the words of a middle-aged Albanian migrant to Italy: “It is difficult for everyone…but maybe for Italians a little less because almost all of them have some savings...But for people like me who have no savings, it is a real problem. And then we also have the problem of the residency permit...after all I did to get papers...I risk losing my residency permit again. It is really difficult.”

While unemployment and loss of residency papers can mainly be attributed to the economic crises, austerity measures have had a more substantial impact on migrant integration programs, which have been hit across the European Union. However, according to a report by the Migration Policy Institute, the most substantial cuts to migrant integration programs (be it through cuts to the programs themselves or through the transfer of the cost to migrants—for instance, by making migrants pay for language classes) have not occurred in the countries that were most hit by the crisis and consequent austerity measures. Instead, they occurred in the Netherlands and in the United Kingdom.

Thus, according to the report, the political climate has been as important as budget constraints in promoting cuts to migrant integration programs. This leads directly to the following section that analyses how different political movements throughout Europe have addressed migration in the context of economic crisis and austerity measures.

**THE POLITICAL CLIMATE AROUND AUSTERITY AND MIGRATION**

Movements and parties critical of austerity have articulated two main positions toward non-EU migrants. On one hand, some have made use of a nationalist rhetoric that does not consider migrants as part of the population hit by austerity, but as an additional burden that is subtracting resources from the national population. Examples of parties that promote this vision include the right-wing Anel Party in Greece or some fringes of the M5S in Italy.

These positions draw on a broader rhetoric of the European right (including parties that are not explicitly antiausterity) that considers migrant workers an external burden on welfare, which, at a time when the welfare state is shrinking, represents a threat to the social and economic rights of citizens. Examples of the rise of political movements who have adopted this rhetoric include Ukip in the United Kingdom (which also targets EU citizens who have migrated to Europe) and the National Front in France.

On the other hand, other antiausterity parties have combined their critiques of current political and economic policies with an inclusive political message that considers non-EU migrants as part of the social body affected by the crisis and austerity measures. The Spanish Podemos and Greek Syriza have advocated for migrant rights in the context of their broader antiausterity politics.

Regarding Podemos, part of the broad coalition of movements that came together in the M-15 demonstrations were explicitly concerned with migrant rights, and this concern has translated into the political orientation of the party. In Podemos’s 2015 program, in fact, the rights of immigrants...
“I am not racist, god forbid…but I give the pieces to the family first...”

in Spain are connected to the defense of the rights of Spanish emigrants abroad, and both are interpreted as part of promoting a universalist notion of citizenship. At the same time, the party also committed to halt deportations and work to close migration detention centers.41

Syriza espoused similar politics, advocating for an acceleration of the asylum-petition process, promoting family reunification, repealing EU restrictions on migrant travel and advocating for the human rights of migrants in detention centers.42

The Italian Movimento Cinque Stelle has had a more contradictory position. The official spokesperson of the party, Beppe Grillo, adopted anti-immigrant positions while the elected deputies of the movement voted to rescind a law that criminalized undocumented migration. In local government, many of the movement’s representatives have adopted a very inclusive attitude toward migration, including Italian citizens of non-European descent in their lists, and publically advocate for reforms to citizenship law.

The electoral success of these three parties testifies to the widespread frustration with the existing social and economic order throughout southern Europe. Furthermore, their positions on migration (be they articulated by the leadership or the grassroots activists of the parties) suggest that there are openings to promote a social and economic rights agenda that is inclusive to the needs of migrants and asylum seekers, as well as to residents and citizens of non-European background.

However, the recent capitulation of the Greek antiausterity government to the demands of the Troika43 raises the question of how much political leverage these movements can have in the current political conjuncture.

---

Stakes and Prospects for the Future—Key Objectives

This paper has shown that various lines of exclusion and marginality are currently being drawn in the European Union: along lines of class (with the increase of poverty and inequality throughout southern Europe), of citizenship and ethnic background (with the “refugee crisis” in the background of anti-immigrant and xenophobic movements), and of regionalism (with increasing regional economic disparities between the northwestern “core” of Europe and its southern peripheries). In this context, political decisions have a central role in determining what European society will look like over the next few decades, how inclusive it will be, and whose economic, social, and political rights will be taken into account. Two issues will be particularly important.

The first concerns the future of the austerity measures that have been implemented in response to the crisis. As this paper has shown, their social costs have been tremendous: poverty and inequality have increased throughout southern Europe, access to health care has been compromised, and the most marginalized sectors of the population have borne the brunt of these measures.44 Anti-austerity movements and
parties have emerged throughout southern Europe and enjoyed considerable electoral success but, for now, the political mainstream on both the left and right remains in favor of austerity policies as a necessary evil to revitalize the economy.

The second concerns the future of the political response to austerity, which so far has developed in two main directions. On one hand, movements such as Anel in Greece and some fringes of the Italian M5S consider non-EU migrants and asylum seekers to be extra burdens on the welfare of EU citizens, rather than fellow victims of the crisis. On the other hand, anti-austerity movements in Greece and Spain have combined a critique of austerity policies with an explicitly pro-migrant agenda, thus advocating for a broad and inclusive notion of “belonging” in Europe.

These dichotomies are not unique to Europe but are a recurring tension in many historic and contemporary settings, not least the United States. Will widespread economic hardship lead to a hardening of lines of exclusion, a narrow definition of belonging along lines of nationality, race or ethnicity, and a scapegoating of certain excluded groups? Or can such moments become an occasion to highlight and question the structural reasons for widespread poverty and inequality, and to create a broad and inclusive understanding of belonging while pushing for transformative change?

In order to achieve the latter in the European context, it will be important to pursue two strategies simultaneously. On one hand, it will be important to reconsider the promise of austerity policies as a spur for economic rejuvenation, the type of growth that would occur were these policies successful, as well as their social costs. Continuing to develop critiques of austerity, giving them increased visibility and legitimacy, and building movements around them is a key way to create the political momentum to produce change.

At the same time, when talking about austerity it is important to adopt a broad and inclusive definition of the “we” who suffer as a consequence of austerity measures and to avoid defining the “we” strictly along lines of citizenship. Creating, promoting, and organizing around a broad, inclusive understanding of “who belongs” is a key precondition to creating a society that is truly inclusive and emancipatory for all.

Contact the author, Ilaria Giglioli, at giglioli@berkeley.edu.
REFERENCES

2 Caritas Europa, The European Crisis
3 Caritas Europa, The European Crisis; IFRC, Think Differently; Oxfam, A Cautionary Tale
4 Greece and Italy have been more strongly hit than Spain by the current arrival of refugees.
5 Oxfam, A Cautionary Tale
6 Caritas Europa, The European Crisis
7 ibid.
8 IFRC, Think Differently
9 Caritas Europa, The European Crisis
10 Ibid.
11 ibid.
12 Forty-three percent of the families assisted by the Red Cross in Spain were unable to afford heating in winter months [IFRC, Think Differently].
13 IFRC, Think Differently
14 Ibid.
15 Caritas Europa, The European Crisis
20 http://missingmigrants.iom.int/
21 http://missingmigrants.iom.int/mediterranean
26 “La paura dell’invasione: ‘La Sicilia non può assorbire una maxi-ondata di sbarchi.’” La Repubblica, February 24, 2011
27 http://effimera.org/se-questa-e-europa-confine-
austerity-e-guerra-di-gabriele-proglio/
28 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-orban-idUSKBN0TL0RFP20151202
30 International Organization for Migration, Fatal Journeys
31 De Luca, “La fatica della resilienza,” p. 235
32 Caritas Europa, The European Crisis
33 Bonifazi and Martini, “Il lavoro degli.”
34 Valls, Coll, and Rivera, “Migración neohispánica?”
35 IFRC, Think Differently; Caritas Europa, The European Crisis.
36 De Luca, La fatica della resilienza,” p. 232.
37 Collett, Immigration Integration
38 ibid.
39 Ukip, Believe in Britain
40 Podemos, El programa del cambio
41 ibid.
42 Chen, “What Does Syriza’s Victory Mean”
44 Caritas Europa, The European Crisis; Oxfam, A Cautionary Tale
45 In the context of the United Kingdom and the destination of many EU migrants, right-wing parties define the circle of belonging even more narrowly by also portraying migrants from southern and eastern Europe as a source of labor competition and a drain on welfare.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

De Luca, V. “La fatica della resilienza. I lavoratori immigrati di fronte all’esperienza della disoccupazione. In D. Coletto,


Nafis White  |  It Doesn't Show Signs of Stopping (detail)
Reflections on Policing

ORGANIZERS IN FIVE COMMUNITIES SPEAK OUT

Interview by Othering & Belonging
Artwork by Nafis White

In the midst of two years of highly publicized, often lethal encounters between police officers and people of color in Ferguson, Baltimore, Cleveland, Chicago, New York, and elsewhere, as well as the increasing involvement of police in immigration enforcement mechanisms, a great many people have expressed serious concern about high levels of police activity and abuse in various communities.
OTHERING & BELONGING ASKED prominent advocates from the Black Lives Matter, Native Lives Matter, LGBTQ, immigrant, and Muslim, Arab, and South Asian communities about the state of organizing on policing and police accountability in those communities. This is what they had to say.

Q. In 2015, we saw a lot of new energy and attention devoted to increasing police accountability and thinking about how to improve police-community relations across the United States. What community or communities do you represent, and what are its key concerns in the policing space?

MA DAMS: I am black, working class, queer, gender-nonconforming, and female assigned. These are all identities I am quite proud of and identities that reflect those most impacted by state and structural violence.

Racism, as commonly defined, has two parts: racial prejudice—what I think of as white supremacy ideology—and power. Many tend to focus on the racial prejudice aspect, which often is followed by answers that focus on increased surveillance—body cameras, for example—or increased cultural competency education, implicit bias training, or counseling for officers. With this focus on reforms that assume
individuals are racist, rather than systems themselves, even the best solutions offered can only reproduce the structures that are killing our communities.

We’ve rarely seen reform efforts that address power by actually deconstructing or taking away power from police departments. To be clear, that kind of power and its structures has a name: colonialism. We think the state’s relationship with black communities is a colonial one.

**FAHD AHMED:** Desis Rising Up and Moving works with working-class and low-income South Asian-descended communities. That includes people from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and members of the South Asian diaspora, especially in the Caribbean.

**Our concerns have grown because we have seen a large increase in proposed legislation to criminalize our communities at the state level.** Allowing local police officers to work on immigration enforcement only increases the fear our communities already feel toward the police.

We have three main concerns related to policing. The first is surveillance of Muslims and those thought to be Muslim. We have police informants and undercover officers in our communities. We have members of the community being followed, harassed, and pressured into becoming informants. We have cases where informants and undercover police essentially incite and entrap community members, and suddenly you have a so-called terrorism case. Second, we’re concerned about our youth, in particular, being harassed on the street by police use of “stop-and-frisk.” We have cases of young people being stopped ten to twenty times, as many as eighty times by the time they are twenty-one years old.

The third issue is the policing of low-wage workers, especially cabdrivers and street vendors. Some cabdrivers report being stopped and ticketed four to six times a month. The ticketing is so frivolous that if they go to court, the judge will probably laugh it off. So they face a decision about whether to lose a workday or pay out of their pockets for frivolous tickets.

**JULIO CALDERON:** I’m undocumented, and I can clearly relate to the struggle of what it means to live in the United States with no identity. I’m one of eleven million undocumented immigrants. I would say 2015 saw a lot of opportunities to build and also create police accountability, but Trump’s comments toward immigrants just helped to criminalize our communities. The deportations continue, and people were already living in fear. When Trump jumped on board with the Republican Party, it allowed racist, anti-immigrant comments, ideas, and even policies to become normalized. Our concerns have grown because we have seen a large increase in proposed legislation to criminalize our communities at the state level. Allowing local police officers to work on immigration enforcement only increases
the fear our communities already feel toward the police.

**SIMON MOYA-SMITH:** I’m a citizen of the Oglala Lakota Nation, so I represent the twenty-first-century Native American community. While Native Americans are the smallest racial minority in our own ancestral land, we are also statistically more likely than anyone else to be killed by police. We are concerned for the safety and well-being of our indigenous families and the continuity of our cultures, languages, and so on.

**ANDREA RITCHIE:** As a black lesbian immigrant, I am part of a number of communities, many of which intersect. Members of these communities experience policing in both similar and different ways. For instance, all experience racial profiling, at times in different contexts and in different forms. As a result, we need protections from profiling based not only on race, religion, and national origin, but also on age, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, immigration status, disability, homelessness, residence in public housing, and tribal status. We also need recognition of gender-specific forms of police violence and effective mechanisms to prevent and ensure accountability for police sexual violence, as well as unlawful searches, including strip searches and cavity searches.

We need to attend to profiling and race-based policing in contexts beyond street and traffic stops, such as policing of “lewd conduct,” prostitution, and poverty; responses to domestic and community violence; child-welfare enforcement; and other sites of gender and sexuality-based police misconduct. Perhaps most challenging, we need to ensure that responses to violence and mental-health crises don’t place survivors of violence at risk of further violence or trauma at the hands of police, requiring us to radically reenvision our approaches to safety.

**Q. Some people say the police are mostly the high-visibility scapegoats for public-sector problems beyond their control—“bad” schools, a court system rigged against people of color, a political system unresponsive to ordinary people, and so on. What’s your response to that claim?**

**JULIO:** The claim might be true to some degree, but the police also have the opportunity to stand with the community, and they haven’t done so in a real way. They should stand with the community and reject the push toward militarization, but they don’t. There is power and control that comes from over militarization, and they love it. They aren’t the roots of the problems, but they help to perpetuate it.

**ANDREA:** Police are definitely on the front lines of creating and enforcing systemic relations of power and privilege, but it is not as if they are without agency or power in doing so. Quite the contrary—police leadership and unions are among the most powerful forces in local and national politics. They drive and are deemed to be the ultimate authorities in debates around crime and safety, and independently, they advance and implement agendas from the “war on drugs” to “broken windows” policing to “zero tolerance” in schools, targeting both individuals and communities of color for enforcement efforts in these contexts. They are far from hapless scapegoats subject to forces beyond their control.

We have defaulted to policing as a response to larger social problems such as
poverty, a public-education system that does not serve the vast majority of low-income students of color, and structural inequality, both within and beyond the criminal legal system. We need to divest from policing and punitive responses and redirect resources toward directly grappling with and addressing these issues in ways that actually increase safety for everyone.

**SIMON:** There are public-sector problems; that is incontrovertible. But there is also systemic racism in police culture. For example, a Navajo woman was recently shot and killed by police because she allegedly had a pair of scissors in her hand. Meanwhile, somewhere, a white man brandishes and waves a gun, yet he lives to see another day. That is a demonstration of the systemic racism found directly in police departments.

**M ADAMS:** It is true that black communities are exploited and oppressed in every single sector. As a result, black people experience the concentrated effect of violence on our lives. It is not only in interactions with the police that our lives are precarious. However, the failure of these sectors in addressing black people’s needs does not excuse the police for the violence they also perpetuate against us. The police are not guiltless, objective arbitrators, as conventional narratives often situate them to be—making them the omniscient “good guys” and us, not so. And, to be frank, even those who are poor, uneducated, and without services or respectability—the ones who are not “good”—is it really too radical, too beyond the pale, to demand that if they encounter the police that they too should live?

This is why we demand community control over the police—to ensure their right, our right, to life. This moment gives us an opening to assert our humanity, freedom, and human rights in policing—but this analysis applies to all sectors. We need to take power from structures and institutions and place it in the hands of the people who are most vulnerable and impacted.

**FAHD:** The police are responsible for the parts they’re responsible for, including the ways they relate to these other institutions. For example, in New York police resist efforts to redirect monies spent enforcing current school-disciplinary practices to restorative-justice approaches. Police advocate for growth in their own budgets even when that undercuts support for social services to meet basic community needs. Yes, the education system, the court system, and the political system are all part of the bigger problem, but so are the police, including unions and police departments.

We’re in an era when policing is thought to be the solution to every social problem. Issues in schools? Minor crime in neighborhoods? Bring in more police! We think one of the primary ways to invest in what we really need—job creation, community
Our interest has always been to save our children, to protect our families. Our strategies have always been to rehumanize ourselves in the eyes of those who dehumanize us.

Building, rebuilding our education system—is to begin divesting from police.

**Q.** A number of different US communities—African Americans, immigrants, LGBTQI, Muslims, Arabs, and South Asian Americans, among others—have serious concerns about police behavior. To what degree are your community’s interests and strategies aligned with those of these other communities?

**Simon:** Native Americans are the first nations of this land, our ancestral land. We were the first to be enslaved and sold by white men. We were the first to be murdered and mutilated for the color of our skin. Our interest has always been to save our children, to protect our families. Our strategies have always been to rehumanize ourselves in the eyes of those who dehumanize us. Still today we are dehumanized, most visibly in the form of sports mascots. The term “redskin” refers to a way of proving the death of an Indian—by showing our scalps. In a nation where a genocide against us occurred, where an estimated one hundred million indigenous people died as a direct consequence of aggressive Christian imperialism and domination, and where we are still murdered today by police—and they still receive medals for killing Indians—our interest has been for more than five hundred years to survive into the next century.

**Julio:** Our communities are very interested in working with every community mentioned. I have to admit it has been hard: we are always intentional in creating those spaces, but there’s been little continuity and follow-through. There is so much to learn from each community, and the liberation of one is tied to the liberation of the other. For example, we have a clear and shared interest in shutting down private prisons, and I believe we can accomplish that only if we come together.

**Andrea:** First, it is critical to recognize intersections among those communities—for instance, among LGBTQI communities, and how LGBTQI people of color bear the brunt of discriminatory policing.

Secondly, what happens during stops—harassment, verbal abuse, physical violence—may look the same across communities, or it may take more specific forms. For instance, for black, immigrant, or LBTQ women, it may be sexual abuse of the kind perpetrated by Oklahoma City police officer Daniel Holtzclaw, or strip and cavity searches in the context of the “war on drugs” or policing of gender, or police violence against pregnant women. For immigrants, a stop may become a path to immigration detention or deportation, and to abuse by immigration authorities as well as police.

For lesbians, policing of gender and sexuality informs race-based policing from the names we are called, to assumptions.
Nafis White | Can I Get a Witness?
made about our behavior, to the lack of protection from violence by those closest to us and our communities at large. For South Asian, Muslim, and Arab communities, it can turn into a “terrorism” investigation, with devastating consequences.

In light of these common and divergent experiences, there is no question that our interests are aligned and that we need to hold these complexities.

**FAHD:** I think about it on three levels. First, we’re very intentional about doing political education with our own communities and membership, for example, showing the evolution of policing in the United States from slave patrols and the repression of workers. We want to ensure that people have the basic political education they need to understand the systems with which we’re contending.

Second, we facilitate relationship building between our members and the members of other organizations and directly-impacted communities: through exchanges, guest speakers, or visiting other organizations. That relationship building helps people bridge gaps and understand each other and understand how the same institutions are targeting different groups in both similar and different ways. Third, we engage in collaborative struggle with other communities.

Putting these three together allows people to think about how we can pursue our interests without undermining the interests of others, and how we can shape our struggle in a way that’s inclusive of all communities. So, for example, many of our youth are subject to bullying in schools, often at the hands of black or Latino youth. Where we used to call for zero-tolerance policies, which led to the disproportionate suspension and expulsion of other youth of color, now we call for restorative-justice practices. Now we aim to build community across groups of students so that antagonisms are resolved rather than deflected by use of punitive measures. We use a similar alignment around other issues.

**M ADAMS:** Intersectionality is at the heart of how we do the movement work we do. In part, this is because myself and those I organize alongside are black, Southeast Asian, queer, trans, disabled, poor, immigrant, and wimmin experiencing mental-wellness challenges, across the life-span, and are just plain struggling to keep things together. Our work is to build family, in the stead of solidarity, because it takes this level of commitment to really build across identities toward collective liberation. We keep these intersections at the fore through our analysis and campaigns.

We use an intersectional human-rights framework that is noncompetitive but sharp enough that the uniqueness of each community remains central and crucial to how we do the work. This analysis was at the root of an intersectionality paper and challenge entitled “Why Police Killing Unarmed Black People is a Queer Issue.” The challenge to mainstream LGBT organizations is to center blackness and the current struggles against police as primary, rather than focus on marriage and shortsighted-policing reforms. It is necessary to hold each other up across identities in recognition of the fact that we are all surviving in and against the same racist colonial structure.
Q. What key lessons from your police-related work in 2015, and possibly earlier, did you bring into 2016?

ANDREA: In 2015, we saw unprecedented attention to women and LGBTQ people’s experiences of policing, from the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing to the Twittersphere to the streets. It brought this incredible energy, along with over twenty-five years of research, documentation, organizing, advocacy, and litigation around the experiences of black women and LGBTQ people and women and LGBTQ people of color, into 2016, with the hopes of seizing on this momentum to move the conversation even further so that we begin to see real change. One key lesson is to think beyond visibility of women and LGBTQ people of color’s experiences of policing within the larger context of racial profiling and police violence, and to begin to ask ourselves how these experiences require us to expand and shift our strategies and advocacy agendas.

M ADAMS: Two things. First, we must build power within black communities. By this I don’t mean listening, though that is certainly important. I mean black and other deeply affected people must be lifted up as the leaders, the policy analysts, and the theory builders. This is a necessary step to societal transformation.

Second, we need enough ideological clarity to be able to discern between reform-based solutions, which are clever ways in which colonialism and neocolonialism reinvents itself, versus smaller shifts of power, which lends itself toward a trajectory of transformation. As a revolutionary I believe all power belongs to the people. I know this will not happen overnight. Therefore, we need a metric and orientation toward the proposed solutions in the interim. Does the proposed reform reduce or end suffering (e.g., monies divested from policing into education, shorter jail sentences)? Is there a true shift of power from the state to the people (e.g., civilian boards with subpoena power, community control over the police)? A sharp analysis gives us insight into things that mislead us, like body cameras.

To me, it’s clear that we must organize around suggestions that shift power.

FAHD: One of our most important lessons was about how to build cross-community solidarity at the grassroots level, among people who suffer the brunt of police abuses, along the lines I talked about before with respect to restorative justice rather than zero-tolerance policies. We also saw that we hadn’t always been thoughtful and consistent about what we mean by police reform. So the use of body cameras might seem like a good idea, but ultimately their use simply increases the flow of funds to police departments.

You can’t solve the problem of police abuse by throwing more money, resources, technology, and equipment at police departments. We have to reduce the footprint of policing in our communities and across the country and invest those resources in our communities and institutions in ways that reduce the need for police in the first place.

JULIO: I believe the police find it hard to see the humanity of a person of color; they see no value in us. In the eyes of many of them, we are disposable. But there are opportunities for them to take a stand and join us. A few of those moments have happened and need to be repeated. The system has been created to keep our movement and the police separated and antagonistic to each other,
but I remember seeing a video where the police took off their helmets and joined the protesters. We need some of that this year.

**SIMON:** The key lesson is that Native Americans are still here and that we are most likely to be killed by police.

**Q. What are your main goals with respect to policing over the next two to three years, and how are you working to achieve them?**

**FAHD:** We want to build the capacity of communities targeted by police to lead the fight themselves by building the base, building their capacities, and providing opportunities to learn how to fight back. And we want to engage in campaigns for police reform. The principles in those campaigns will include not harming other communities, building solidarity across communities, and not giving greater power to police in any way. We don’t have the people or strength to completely overhaul policing. But we can teach people how to fight and increase the base of people interested in having the fight.

**SIMON:** My main goal is to remind people that racism is at the bedrock of this nation. That if you are not Native American, you are the direct beneficiary of aggressive Indian removal policies and actions. People say that their family has “always fought for this land.” Bullshit. There are restaurants in Europe older than this country. I want to remind people that twenty troops of the US Seventh Cavalry received the Medal of Honor for their participation in the Wounded Knee Massacre in December 1890.

That racism has been at the foundation of authority in this country before there were any other races here except for we, indigenous peoples, and the white man. Our goals are to achieve unmitigated recognition of what this country has done in order to fully comprehend what it is doing and why it’s doing it. Know your history, Jack.

**M ADAMS:** The first thing we seek to accomplish is to build out a clear analysis of the fundamental problems that face us. If we don’t have a clear sense of the fundamental problems, it is impossible to truly dismantle the structures that cause them. For us, this means developing our analysis about the conditions that black people in the United States face—to understand that what we need to focus primarily on are structures and systems, not racist attitudes and dispositions. It is a charge to address the colonial relationship that black communities are subjected to in the United States, and not to focus on improving attitudes or relations of state actors. We must build ideological clarity on the issue and how to address it.

We also seek to build a base of those most impacted and to build movement infrastructure that is sustainable through the different crises our communities experience. We want long-term organization. This means people most impacted develop a shared analysis, build unity around a common vision, develop their skills to address the problems faced, and resist!

**ANDREA:** My goals are to ensure women and LGBTQ people of color’s experiences drive our analysis of racial profiling, police violence, and violence against women and LGBTQ people, as well as agendas for change. I’m pursuing that in multiple ways. One is working toward implementation of recommendations of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing of particular...
importance to women and LGBTQ people, through federal advocacy and supporting local advocates to ensure implementation on the ground. I am also continuing to think through what bringing women and LGBTQ people’s experiences to the center means for solutions being advanced—whether it’s body cameras, special prosecutors, or civilian oversight and control of policing.

In 2016 I will also continue to push for examination of how police responses to violence produce further violence and punishment rather than protection for all too many women and LGBTQ people of color. These experiences demand that we envision new approaches to safety—whether it’s revisiting mandatory-arrest policies that produce disproportionate arrests of women and LGBTQ people of color, who are survivors of domestic and interpersonal violence, while failing to produce increased safety, or developing alternate responses to mental-health crises that don’t involve police.

You can’t solve the problem of police abuse by throwing more money, resources, technology, and equipment at police departments. We have to reduce the footprint of policing in our communities and across the country and invest those resources in our communities and institutions in ways that reduce the need for police in the first place.

**JULIO:** The collaboration between Immigration and Customs Enforcement and police increases deportations and fear in our communities. We need to increase and protect the sanctuary cities. That is a very clear goal and helps us have an idea how to work and build at a local level. If the number of sanctuary cities goes up, the number of deportations will decrease drastically.

**Q.** Many years from now, as you bounce your grandchild on your knee, give us one image that captures the new era of policing—with respect to your community—that your work will have helped bring about.

**M ADAMS:** There will be complete community control of the police. What I mean by this is that communities will have all the power to decide and develop their vision of what a secure and safe community is and how security and safety are maintained. In the interim that means we fight for the ability to hire/fire officers, have officers who live in the communities they serve, and have communities determine the priorities, policies, and practices of police institutions. Essentially, this means creating a democratic structure of policing.

In order for this to be real, we know ultimately that the police and policing institutions of today must be abolished. In their stead, communities will determine how to make their own communities safe. We will have brought this transformation about by offering analysis of the current system, as well as theory and method for how to bring
about change that puts power in the hands of communities.

**FAHD:** On the macro level, we would prioritize human needs and human development of all rather than things like efficiency and profits. We’d see a shift to giving primacy to the development of whole human beings and of their social, economic, psychological, physical, and spiritual well-being, both individually and collectively.

Secondly, there are structures in place to allow communities input, decision-making, and control over the institutions that affect their lives, including systems of policing, education, and economics—these and the other basic structures and institutions that exist in our society. To do all this we’d have to do away with all the implicit and explicit hierarchies we create among ourselves based on race, gender, sexuality, geography, and more. We’d need a truly egalitarian understanding of human beings.

**JULIO:** My image is of unarmed police working to help the community. We need to stop allowing police to enforce the laws a few create to profit, control, and kill. I envision an officer engaged in every aspect of the local community, which will bring about much greater trust and better communication. I want my grandchild to feel protected and inspired when next to an officer, like he would feel next to a family member.

**SIMON:** “You know, my dear, they never lifted the bounty on Native American heads. So the hunt continued into 2016. The authorities were killing all of us, and the bastards were still getting medals for killing Indians. And we couldn’t get the mainstream media to talk about the killing of our people either. Not black reporters. Not Latino reporters. Not gay reporters. Not Asian reporters. No one, my dear. At least not enough. The conversation was binary on the matter of police brutality: black and white. Black and white. Black and white. And then, when we tried to talk about police killing Native Americans more than any other race, we’d get, ‘We’re not talking about that right now! You’ll have your chance!’ But we never did.

“Back then, Americans would attend Washington R-word football games in red face, and then they’d tell us that they were ‘honoring’ Native Americans—that red face ‘isn’t racist.’ Meanwhile, a cop would kill another Native American and then another and then another, and hardly any news outlets would say anything about it. We were cancelled out of the American conversation on almost every subject. A cop tried to kill me once, but he missed. That’s why I don’t have a knee to bounce you on. Not much has changed since then. We’re still not human to Americans, not in their eyes. We remain ‘the Indian problem.’ The myth. The mascot. That thing to be ridiculed and dehumanized in service to their greed and self-interest.”

**ANDREA:** Instead of having to give my grandchild a comprehensive “know your rights” training and brainstorm strategies for safety and surviving police encounters, we will be talking about what our responsibilities are to each other and to those around us to ensure the safety of all members of our community in ways that don’t involve policing and punishment, but rather care, community accountability, structural equality, and radical personal and societal transformation. We will be dreaming of a world without police and prisons, actively working to bring it into being together.
KIMBERLEE RANDLE-KING, who was found strangled by her own t-shirt on September 19, 2014, in a jail cell in Pagedale, MO, where she was being held for outstanding warrants due to a dispute with another woman. Randle-King had two children and no history of depression, according to her family.
I’ve been pulled over for traffic violations just a few times in my life. Only once was I taken into a station.

It was a Sunday morning in Hyde Park, on the south side of Chicago. Instead of sleeping in or nursing a hangover, I was on my way to church so I could do research for my Durkheim paper on collective effervescence. I went to pick up a friend and pulled up to his house by making a U-turn in a four-way intersection. There was no one around but a cop car that I didn’t notice.

On inspecting my documents, the cop discovered that my license had expired. He seemed embarrassed. Now he actually had to report me instead of giving me a ticket. He didn’t make me get into his car to go to the station. Instead, my friend was asked to drive me there, following behind him. In the station, he asked me questions and filled in a form. We sat in a room lined with benches. Handcuff rings stuck out of the walls just above the benches. I was dressed in a navy blue suit, for church. Out of the corner of my eyes, I watched a slow Sunday-morning parade of African Americans being brought in, in handcuffs. “Is that how you’re getting your dates these days?” shouted one cop to another, who was bringing in a couple of streetwalkers.

On that occasion, and most others, I was treated with politeness and respect. Usually, when I’m pulled over, the police officer almost acts as if he’s made a mistake. I usually get a warning, not even a ticket. There are some parts of the United States where it’s easy enough to pay no heed to one’s own white privilege, but the south side of Chicago is not one of them.

The University of Chicago, where I attended college and graduate school, is bordered by predominantly African American neighborhoods on three sides, and the lake, on the fourth. In college, I never paid my parking tickets. Driving late to campus, I’d park in front of fire hydrants, down alleyways, too close to corners, and in loading zones. The floor of my car was papered with
tickets. I evaded the famous “Denver boot,” but if one had been placed on my car, my father would have bailed me out with a bit of grumbling.

I routinely drove fifteen to twenty miles above the speed limit on south Lake Shore Drive. The shoulder of the road was dotted with cars pulled over by police. All had black drivers. Whenever I was pulled over in Hyde Park, except for that one occasion, the cops acted as though they’d made a mistake and sent me on my way. I knew perfectly well that I was a beneficiary of white privilege, and all my white friends did as well.

Over this past summer, with the death of Sandra Bland, and the video that was released of her arrest for a minor traffic violation, news of other mysterious deaths, possible suicides, began to roll in. Four, five, then six African American women were found dead in their jail cells. Most had committed only minor infractions: moving violations, shoplifting, altercations. The kinds of things white women are less likely to get arrested for or, if they are arrested, are unlikely to end up in jail cells for. People of low income are often forced to post bonds that are impossible to pay. Tickets go unpaid because they’re unaffordable; warrants are issued, more fines are levied, and pretty soon you end up in jail, unable to leave unless you pay outsized fines.

This is the egregious pattern detailed in the US Department of Justice’s report on the city of Ferguson, MO, and that pattern is not unique; it’s duplicated again and again, throughout the country. The poor and the disenfranchised are used as municipal piggy banks through aggressive policing of minor crimes.

I was haunted by what little I knew about these women dying in their cells. I decided to find photos of them—not their mugshots but photos that showed them the way they wished to be seen. I started on a journey of

---

**KINDRA CHAPMAN,** 18, was found dead in her jail cell in Homewood, Alabama, on July 14, 2015, an apparent suicide. Chapman had been arrested a few hours before for stealing a cell phone. Video surveillance shows that “she appeared to be agitated, and she attempted to damage the contents of the cell. She knocked over a water cooler, took a bed sheet, and stood on the cooler to tie the bed sheet to a wall support rail extending from the ceiling. She then used the sheet to commit suicide.”
collecting images. I found there were very few. My paintings are based on blurry selfies taken by women who lived precarious lives.

For their families, the stigma of suicide paired with the stigma of incarceration may have played a role in muting the instinct to memorialize their dead. There are newspaper reports of each death, but they’re perfunctory—maybe a brief quote from a bereaved spouse or parent. I’m reminded of the very different reporting on white victims of crime and on celebrity suicides. Elegies are dedicated to the special qualities that make up a person’s life: their hobbies, their personalities, the people who will grieve them, who loved them.

There are no publicly posted elegies for these women that I could find. All that remains are the photos littered about Google image search, and for these I am grateful. One woman, Alexis McGovern, twenty-eight, who died in police custody in St. Louis, MO, very close to Ferguson, leaves no photographic trace at all.

As I researched, I found more and more names, more deaths. In some cases, the details were not quite the same. One woman was Native American. One woman died in prison, not jail. Each day I go to find information about one woman, I accidentally come upon another case that resembles it. I came to realize the project would have to be open-ended and ongoing.

For the moment, I’m posting ten portraits I painted. I intend to make more. As I painted, I felt an urge to memorialize. I welcome more information about any of these women or others. My hope in the future would be to show them all together and auction them as a benefit for their families, many of whom have difficult legal battles ahead, as they try to learn what happened to make their daughters or their mothers or their sisters take their own lives in police custody or die suddenly when no medical attention was proffered.
Fifteen hours before RALKINA JONES was found dead in the bed of her jail cell in Cleveland Heights, Ohio, she said, “I don’t want to die in your cell.” Video footage shows her speaking of her medical problems during her booking for her arrest for assaulting her abusive ex-husband. Police were reportedly attentive to her medical needs, although it is not clear they provided her with the medications she needed. On the morning of July 26, 2015, she was found unresponsive. Jones was 37 and a mother of one.
On July 13, 2015, **SANDRA BLAND** was found dead in her jail cell in Waller County, Texas. Her death was ruled a suicide, by hanging, but her family disputes any claims that she was suicidal. Bland was pulled over for failing to signal a lane change. A dashboard video recording of her interaction with the police officer shows their conversation became heated, with the officer demanding she get out of the car, and pointing his taser at her, saying, “I will light you up.” When Bland called a family member from the jail, she asked, “How did switching lanes with no signal turn into all of this?”
22-year-old **REKIA BOYD** was shot to death on March 21, 2012 in an alley in Chicago by an off-duty Chicago police detective with an unregistered firearm. The detective was charged with involuntary manslaughter and acquitted on the grounds that the killing was deliberate. He thought Boyd held a gun in her hand; it was a cell phone.
On July 22, 2015, Joyce Curnell, 50, was found unresponsive in her cell at Sheriff Cannon Detention Center, in Charleston, SC. She had been booked at the detention center the day before for an outstanding bench warrant for shoplifting. Prior to being sent to jail, Curnell had briefly been taken to a hospital for a ‘medical issue.’
Portrait of **SARAH LEE CIRCLE BEAR**, a Native American woman who was found dead in her holding cell on July 6, 2015 at Brown County Jail in Aberdeen, SD. As Sarah Sunshine Manning writes, “Witnesses stated that before being transferred to a holding cell, Circle Bear pleaded to jailers that she was in excruciating pain. Jail staff allegedly responded by dismissing her cries for help, telling her to “knock it off,” and “quit faking.” Witnesses say that inmates cried out for the jail staff to help Circle Bear, to which they eventually responded by picking her up off the floor, dragging her out of the cell, and transferring her to a holding cell. Circle Bear was later found unresponsive in the holding cell.
Portrait of SHENEQUE PROCTOR, a 18-year-old woman from Bessemer, Alabama, who was found dead in her jail cell on November 2, 2014. She was arrested for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest. Though toxicology reports show the possibility of drug overdose, she had a history of asthma and was ignored in her cell for many hours despite labored breathing.
RAYNETTA TURNER, 43, was found dead in her jail cell two days after she was arrested for shoplifting from a wholesale food store in Mount Vernon, NY. After informing the police of hypertension and issues following bariatric surgery, she was taken to a hospital and then released back to the police the next day. The following day, on July 27, 2015, she was found to be unresponsive in her cell. Turner had eight children; her husband Herman Turner told reporters, “All I know is my wife is dead, and no one is saying anything. She was a mother, she was a wife. She was mine. No longer is she mine.”
On August 25, 2015, DOMINIQUE GAIL WORRELL, 26, was found dead in her cell of an apparent suicide by hanging. Worrell had been convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, inflicting serious injury, in a stabbing incident, in Raleigh N.C. Worrell was a former model and mother of two young daughters. Her family had no indication that she felt suicidal. I happened upon her Sound Cloud page.
Alex Sorto | Take a Look at Yourself (music video)
**Take a Look at Ourselves**

*Villy Wang with Alex Sorto*

**HOPE. BEING SURROUNDED BY** our youth media producers at the Bayview-Hunters Point Center for Arts and Technology (BAYCAT) gives me hope: young graduates like Alex Sorto, one of the rappers and media producers behind the award-winning, youth-produced music video *Take a Look at Yourself*. We found Alex when he was seventeen while at one of our digital-media-arts workshops at San Francisco International High School.

Actually, I should say that he found us. You know those kids who show a precocious amount of initiative and drive? That’s Alex. I mean, he has an email signature that says, “Future CEO and Founder.”

You know those kids who show a precocious amount of initiative and drive? That’s Alex. I mean, he has an email signature that says, “Future CEO and Founder.”

He’s nineteen.

BAYCAT’s model is to educate and empower youth to be storytellers. Through BAYCAT Academy, we provide free classes for youth, ages eleven to seventeen, from low-income and low-opportunity communities. From concept to production to editing, we give them professional digital-media tools to do their own media projects. *Take a Look at Yourself* is one example of the many ways our youth express themselves through their art, their voices, and their views—creating music, music videos, documentary film, and animation.
Every day is a dream come true with our youth; in their work, creativity meets storytelling meets social justice. Each semester, our youth produce a television show, Zoom In, that focuses on a different topic. For Episode 32, “The Future Today,” for example, thirty youth media producers examined how they are shaping our future today with all that they learn, do, and create. As the youth brainstorm how to approach each show, our professional mentors and instructors encourage them to critically think about the media they see and to reflect on their own experiences as the starting points for the story they tell.

For the making of Take a Look at Yourself, Alex recalls, “We talked about racism, bullying, and stereotypes, and in our video, there are three African Americans and me, a Latino from Honduras. We decided to write about our own experiences growing up, and how the media stereotypes African Americans, Muslims, Latinos, and LGBTQ people.

“We came up with ‘The media is not always good. It only shows what’s wrong with the “hood,”’ for the simple reason that most of the TV channels, newspapers, and other mediums provide information to the public that just show the bad stuff that happens. For example, I haven’t heard or read an article where they talk about the rapper, singer, and producer Akon, and how he gave solar power to millions of householders in Africa. Have you watched a news report that talks about the different nonprofits that help and keep youth off the street? Because I haven’t.”

Have you watched a news report that talks about the different nonprofits that help and keep youth off the street? Because I haven’t.”
This is why I started BAYCAT over twelve years ago. Alex is much more self-aware and “world” aware than I was at his age. I never had conversations about race and media representations at school, at home, or even at church. We weren’t encouraged to embrace our racial identities. Alex proudly raps in Spanish and says, “That’s the point. We have English-speaking rappers to talk about the struggle of African Americans, and a Spanish rapper to talk about the struggles in Spanish. Being bilingual is a big gift.”

BAYCAT is a creative and safe “sandbox” filled with tech and digital-media “toys” and surrounded by dedicated digital-media professionals, role models, and teachers. At our core is collective creative expression for social justice, but, ultimately, it really is about “The Future Today.” According to the US Department of Labor, 65 percent of today’s grade-school students will work at jobs that haven’t been invented yet. BAYCAT has created a pathway from education to employment for youth and young adults, ages eleven to twenty-five. We believe that creativity and innovation are vital to our youth’s success in life and in the workplace, whether they aspire to be pilots, doctors, teachers, bankers, lawyers, filmmakers, or future CEOs and founders.

Just as Alex does, I’d like to reimagine our world. Instead of waking up to news feeds that amplify harmful negative stereotypes, what if we amplify our youth-produced stories and songs? What if we start each day by watching Take a Look at Yourself or any of our youth-produced media. As Alex poignantly says, “As you know, we use media daily. We, the next generation, have the power to change what we see on social networks. You and me are the media, and we are responsible for what we want to watch on it.”
Alex Sorto | Take a Look at Yourself (music video)
We are responsible for what we watch and what we invest in today and for the future. Check out and share Alex’s story, *This Is Me*, and his work. Come join our “sandbox” to create more opportunities for our youth.

*Take a Look at Yourself* won the Student/Mentor Music Video Category, 2015 My Hero International Film Festival; the Best Music Video (ages thirteen to nineteen) and Audience Award, 2015 RYSE Film Festival: Truth Be Told Justice Through My Eyes; and Second Place at the 2015 Peace in the Streets Global Film Festival.

SAVE THE DATE:
SPRING 2017

OTHERING & BELONGING
A NATIONAL CONFERENCE

Visit conference.otheringandbelonging.org
to sign up for our mailing list,
to find out about early registration and
confirmed speakers for our 2017 conference,
and to read our blog and watch videos
with contemporary perspectives on
challenging Othering and creating Belonging.
Othering & Belonging

*Othering & Belonging* reflects the broader vision and mission of UC Berkeley’s Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive to interrogate and challenge social cleavages and hierarchies based on differential power, privilege, and access to resources.

WWW.OTHERINGANDBELONGING.ORG